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This thesis analyzes the impact of the October 1973
Middle East War on super-power Middle East policy. The
analysis is conducted within the context of the overall
Middle East crisis, both before and after the 1973 War.
Consideration is given to the historical roles of the
US and USSR in the Middle East to highlight the changes in
those roles as a result of the War . New patterns of super-
power involvement in the area are described and the potential
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(A) Names of persons or places that occur in translation
are spelled as they normally occur in the original
source. For example, "Nasir" is usually spelled "Nasser"
in Western sources.
(B) Generally Arabic names and places have been spelled in
the shortened (double consonants removed) form, not the
Western form. Exception may occur in quotation.
(C) Hebraic or Israeli names are spelled in commonly accepted
Western form. For example, "Israel" vice "Isra'il".
(D) Although Arabic and consequently many translations do
not utilize capital letters, proper nouns have been
capitalized in conformity with English usage.
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The involvement of non-middle eastern powers in Middle
East affairs is as old as history itself, from before Alex-
ander of Macedon to Henry Kissinger, conflicts have swept
through the area with some degree of non-local participation.
Currently, the overall situation is similar to a scarred and
battered but complex tree of problems whose roots entertwine
about historical rocks and reach into a subsoil of passions,
and underground caverns of greed and fear. Such a tree cannot
be removed by simply cutting off the trunk and sprinkling a
grass seed of economic aid on the stump. If grass is to grow
the roots must either be dug out and removed or buried suffi-
ciently deep in a subsoil of time for the advantages of peace
to become apparent. The modern world rests on a delicate
balance of multi-polar politics which faces tremendous de-
stabilizing pressures of conflicting states, cultures, and
ideologies competing for the world's reserves of food, minerals
and energy. Technology must be believed capable of solving
these problems if man is to survive, but technical solutions
take time, opportunity, and wealth. Time is running out.
The Middle East is not only sitting on top of the greatest
single source of wealth which may be brought to bear on the
world's problems (or used to destroy the future) but is also
strategically located on the traditional routes of conquerors.
It is natural, therefore, that the major powers would gravi-
tate toward and attempt to control this vital area.

It is the contention of this paper that (A) as a result
of changes in the overall Middle East situation during and
resulting from the October 1973 war that an opportunity for
a peaceful solution to the situation has been created.
(B) further, both this opportunity and the dangers of not
exercising it have been recognized to a greater degree than
any previous time in modern history, and (C) as a result of
(A) * (B) significant changes in super-power behavior have
occurred which are making the possibility of an eventual
solution less remote. Just as in many games of chance where
the opportunities are great, the risks are great and a solu-
tion may come only if the two super-powers (particularly the
US) are willing to accept substantial long term commitments
to both sides of the conflict.

II. CONCEPT AND BACKGROUND
Super-power involvement in all strategic areas of the
world is an accepted feature of today's world but the Middle
East in the post 1973 war period stands out, both in the
degree and scope, of super-power involvement. From 1971 to
1973, for example, the US had only routine diplomatic con-
tacts concerning the Middle East, but from October 1973 to
May 1974 the US Secretary of State devoted between 1/2 and
2/3 of his total available time and effort to the area.
Assuming that the US Secretary of State's time is primarily
(but of course recognizing that it is not, exclusively) devoted
to securing for the US, a stable foreign policy which supports
the interests of the US, an obviously significant change had
occurred. This change of diplomatic consciousness was not,
as will be shown, limited to the US but was at least tacitly
2
agreed to by the USSR. Another indicator of the seriousness
of change was the October 19 7 3 world-wide nuclear alert of
US forces to a degree not seen since the Cuban missile crisis.
These changes of pattern are reflections of the shattering
changes brought about by the events around the October war.
Quandt, William B., "Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli
Disengagement Negotiations", Journal of International Affairs ,
v. 9, #1, p. 38, 1975.
2Safran, Nadav, "Engagement in the Middle East", Foreign
Affairs Quarterly, v. 54, p. 57, October 1974.
10

This paper will attempt to outline these diplomatic changes,
concentrating on the resulting new roles of the super-powers
.
All of the objective conditions of the Arab-Israeli (See note
on transliteration page 6) conflict must, of course, be
dealt with to achieve any degree of comprehensiveness in
achieving these goals. Since the paper is predicated on
changes in these conditions, it will be necessary to briefly
outline their development. Additionally, the historical role
of the super-powers must be considered if changing patterns
are to be discerned. These essentially descriptive problems
will be limited in time to the 2 0th century since to go back
further in the past would unduly expand the scope and place
limits on the ability to concentrate on the post 1973 period.
After discussing the historical background and describing
the changes in Middle East super-power diplomacy as perceived
by interested parties in the area, the significance of these
changes must be analyzed. In what ways were the changes
brought about? What relationship (s) if any, exist between
the new diplomatic efforts and oil, detente, and the internal
politics of both major and minor powers of the Middle East?
What are the perceptions of Middle East governments regarding
the role of the PLO? Why did optimism on a settlement run on
and off following the war? All of these questions are believed
to be in some way related to the current super-power efforts
and will be considered in building toward an analysis of
future policies which would impact on developments in the
11

area. In order to consider all of these diverse areas appro-
priately it will be necessary to spend considerable effort
on the events of the October war itself (Section III and IV)
.
Finally, super-power involvement in the Middle East is part
of a continuing process of change which perhaps should not
be separated from the world's macro-problems of food, energy
and survival. Some limitation must be placed on the scope of
all endeavor and these macro-problems will be only indirectly
considered.
Foreign involvement in the Middle East is, of course, not
limited to the 20th century but goes back throughout history.
At the beginning of the 2 0th century the remnants of thousands
of years were still visible, but elements of change were also
present. The Ottoman Empire nominally controlled the majority
of the area although significant inroads had been made by
European powers. Britain held Cyprus and Egypt. Syria and
Lebanon were experiencing political unrest left over from the
brief Turkisk Constitution of 1878 and the literary movements
3
of American and French educators. In Syria, a Pan-Arab
movement stressed a revival of Islam under an Arab Caliphate.
The modern Zionist movement was in existence as were nation-
alistic movements in most of the Middle East countries.
Major foreign interests in the area centered around strategic
3Middle East A Political and Economic Survey , ed. by W
Mansfield, p~ IT, Oxford Press, London, 1973.
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considerations and were colonial and imperialistic in nature.
Of the two super-powers to be, of the 1970' s, Russia had
evinced interest in the Holy places, the US had made only
minor impacts. Palestine was simple a barren backwater,
administered in part as the Sanjaq of Jerusalem and in part
4
as the Vilayet of Beirut. Its population was approximately
600,000 Arabs and 80,000 Jews. Most of the Jewish popula-
tion lived in the holy cities in relative harmony with their
Arab neighbors. There were, however, several thousand Jews
who lived in agricultural communes established by Western
funds and concessions imposed upon the Sultan. These
colonies hoped to eventually realize the dream of Zionism
7
and were beginning to be disliked by Arab scholars. Islam
in all its variations rested securely over the entire area,
largely unalerted to the impending upheavals of the 2 0th
century.
World War I proved to be a major watershed in the devel-
opment of the Middle East crisis. Even after the passage




, p. 23, London, 1937. (See
Appendix A Table 1 for population estimate.)
Op. cit. , Middle East A Political and Economic Survey ,
p. 48.
7Mandel, N. , Zionism and Indigenous Population of Pales -
tine
, Thesis, Oxford University, London, 1965.
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of World War I are cited by authors of both sides of the
Middle East as bearing on the conflict there. Unfortunately,
more often than not, current writers fail to portray these
circumstances within the context of a world war whose major
protagonists believed their very survival at stake. In addi-
tion to the implications of the overall results of the war,
including the break-up of the Ottoman Empire and imposition
of Western mandatory power over portions of the Middle East,
some of the famour or infamous documents of the war years
should be considered. The McMahon correspondence, the
Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour declaration are often
used and abused in the current age.
Sir Henry McMahon was British High Commissioner in Egypt
during World War I. He was tasked by the Foreign Office in
late 1915 to communicate with Sharif Hussein of Mecca to
secure Hussein's opposition to the Ottoman Sultan's call for
a jihad against the British. Hussein was encouraged to revolt
against Ottoman rule. In return, British assistance for the
revolt was promised and delivered. The Arab revolt tied
down some 30,000 Turkish troops along the Amman-Medina Rail-
road and effectively secured the right flank of the British
army in Palestine. British commitments for the post revolt
period, as far as a kingdom for the Sharif, is less than clear,
The Arabs maintain it included Palestine — the British that
14

it did not. Post war claims have often failed to recognize
that the primary motivation of the British was to preserve
their strategic interest with respect to India, Egypt and
Allied communications in the Far East.
In 1916, Britain and France, with the agreement of
Russia, formed the Sykes-Picot Agreement whose provisions
not only carved the expired carcass of the Ottoman Empire
(see Appendix C for map) , but did so in a way that conflicted
with the degree and scope of Arab independence envisioned in
9Hussein-McMahon correspondence. In 1917 the Balfour Declara-
tion stated that "His Majesty's government view with favor
the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the
Jewish People, and will use their best endeavors to facili-
tate the achievement of this object, it being clearly under-
stood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the
religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in
Palestine." Multiple rationales have been put forth for
the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, they include morality,
humanitarianism, strategic considerations and internal Bri-
tish politics. The precise weighting of these factors is
o
Op. cit. , Middle East A Political and Economic Survey
,
p. 13.
9 Ibid., (See Appendix C for outline of Sykes-Picot par-




unimportant here except that considerable evidence does exist
indicating that the document was definitely related to Bri-
ll ...
tain's war effort. It significance to modern diplomacy
lies in the legal premise claimed by supporters of Israel's
existance. The Arab world strenuously objected (s) to both
the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour Declaration as
betrayals of commitments made to the Arabs during the war.
The post World War I treaties and the imposition of Western
mandatories further alienated the Arab leadership effectively
shifting the Arab nationalism from resistance of the Turks
to resistance of the Mandatory powers . Since the mandatory
powers were Christian and had supported Jewish imigration
into Palestine while reneging (in the Arab view) on commit-
ments made to the Arabs, Islam began to be drawn into the
hostility against the mandatory powers and eventually against
the Jewish influx itself. Thus by the end of World War I,
two elements of the current problem had been created — terri-
torial conflict and the Jewish presence, both thoroughly
laced with hostility toward the West. Britain, as the
dominant mandatory power, became the target for most anti-
Western feeling.
During the inter-World War I — World War II period, the
Palestine problem became increasingly tense, this situation
resulted in violence from 1920 on. This violence was studied




by numerous inquirers both official and unofficial. These
efforts resulted in numerous reports, white papers, etc.,
most of which were of little long term significance. One
Royal Commission, the Peel Commission, was the first official
document to state a belief that hostilities in the area were
unresolvable and recommended partition into two states —
Jewish and Arab (see Appendix B for proposed plans) , but
. . 12
with Britain retaining control of the area. The specific
plan was rejected by both Jewish and Arab communities and
the open hostilities continued. Jewish immigration grew
during the 1930's until by 1937 Jews made up approximately
1/3 of the total population of Palestine (see Appendix A
Table 1) . While later studies considered the Peel Commission's
plan unworkable, the idea of one Arab and one Jewish state
in Palestine surfaces regularly. Arab objection to the plans
centered around the existence of a Jewish entity with Pales-
tine. Arab efforts in Palestine had by 1939, placed suffi-
cient pressure on Great Britain to result in the issuance of
a new White Paper which restricted Jewish immigration,
restricted land purchase by Jews
,
proposed an independent
Palestinian state with a population ratio fixed as it existed
at the time ( 2 to 1 Arab to Jewish) . The paper also made no
provision for Jewish autonomy. This new state was to be
established within ten years time. The White Paper, as might






be expected, was hotly opposed by Zionist organizations, the
League of Nations considered it not in accord with the spirit
of the mandate and even the Arab interests would have pre-
ferred immediate independence and a complete halt to Jewish
immigration. Until the end of the mandate, however, the
13White Paper of 1939 remained official British policy.
World War II essentially put the conflict in Palestine
on hold, with a majority of both Zionist and Arab supporting
the Allied cause with varying degrees of enthusiasm depending
upon the fortunes of war. Certain Arab elements did support
the Axis and the dissident Stern Group did continue violence
against the British as a result of the 1939 White Paper.
World War II Nazi repression of the Jews in Europe did,
however, add to or intensify the overall problem. Sympathy
for the Jewish community spread world-wide as the complete
story of the atrocities became known. Pressure mounted on the
British from within Palestine as both the Jews and Arabs strove
for independence. American involvement grew in November 194 5,
as a Joint Anglo-American Commission studied the possibility
of relocating European Jewish refugees to Palestine. The
committee recommended such a relocation in 1946 but did not
14
address the political future of the area. President
13Political Dictionary of the Middle East in the 2 0th
Century , ed. by yT Shimoni and E. Levine, Rev. ed., p. 296
and p. 420, Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., New York, 1974
14 Ibid., p. 297.
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Truman accepted the plan and began pressing the British for
its acceptance, Arab hostility to such a plan led to British
hesitation and the violence which had subsided during World
War II resumed. The British, frustrated and under economic
pressure resulting from the costs of World War II, decided
that the only way out of the dilemma in Palestine was to
withdraw. Accordingly, in April 1947, they turned the entire
problem over to the UN and declared their intention to with-
draw from the area. A UN commission studied the situation
and proposed two partition plans. One of these plans was
accepted by the UN General Assembly in November 1947 (Appen-
dix D for map) but categorically rejected by Arab leaders.
The British announced that they would neither implement the
plan nor allow a UN commission to supervise it. Jewish and
Arab groups openly began to consolidate their control in
various areas of Palestine. Contested areas became local
guerrilla warfare battlegrounds from February to March 194 8
prior to the British withdrawal and proclamation of the State
of Israel on 14 May 1948. This guerrilla warfare resulted
in the creation of a new element in the Palestine problem —
the refugees — Arabs in Palestine who fled or were expelled
15from their homes during the conflict. The traumas and
atrocities of this period are explained in very differing
15
Ibid., p. 299. (See Appendix A, Tables 2, 3 and 4
for data on Palestinian-Arab refugee distributions.)
19

ways by the two sides. Regardless of which side is more
correct, or perhaps less incorrect, the sudden movement of
550,000 - 700,000 Palestinian Arabs to the Arab-held areas
in Jordan, the West Bank (Jordon occupied) and the Gaza
Strip caused a problem whose settlement has yet to be resolved
(See Appendix A Tables 2, 3 and 4 for development of refugee
problem.) The magnitude of the numbers involved meant that
they could not be ignored and yet most writings of the period
refer to those Palestinian Arabs as simply refugees, as if
they had no previous existence or homes.
The organized warfare following the British withdrawal
resulted in an Israel roughly 2600 square miles larger than
the Jewish area in the UN Partition Plan. A state had
been created within the old mandate area with leftover por-
tions occupied by surrounding Arab nations. The boundaries
of this state (and its very existence in some views) form
another essential element of the conflict which remain in
contention today. The creation of Israel also marked the
withdrawal of the British in the area, an absence which
created a vacuum into which the US and USSR have (for a
multiplicity of reasons) moved, forming yet another new
element of the current conflict. Finally, the 1948 conflict
raised the issue of the Holy Places of Jerusalem which
1 c




continues to rankle Muslim emotions around the globe.
Since the 1948 war and prior to 1973, the Israeli-Arab con-
flict has twice erupted in intense open warfare, and through-
out the twenty-five year period guerrilla operations, repri-
sals and hostility have been the norm rather than the excep-
tion. During this 25 year period, patterns emerged of Israeli
military domination, increased Arab bitterness and implaca-
bility as they felt their honor impugned by continuous Israeli
victories. This led, in turn, to internal efforts in all
Arab states for politicians to outbid one another in attempts
to be more hostile toward Israel which was viewed as an exten-
sion of Western imperialist powers. As each successive war
proved unsuccessful to the regular armies of the Arab states,
a plethora of Palestinian guerrilla groups arose that grew in
strength to the point where they became a threat to some of
the Arab states in the area. Actual open conflict between
guerrillas and Jordanian forces occurred in 1970. Attitudes
of all participants in the area hardened to uncompromising
hostility. Following the 196 7 war, for example, Israeli
leaders often stressed that Israel would not return to her
pre-war borders, that any settlement required direct nego-
tiations between Arab states and Israel. Arab leaders accused
Israel of acting as an agent of the West and refused negotiations
17Armajani, Yahya, Middle East Past and Present
, p
375, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970
21

until after an Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders. The
US was accused of directly supporting and encouraging Israeli
aggression. The USSR was seen by the US as exploiting the
unrest in the area and using it to enhance her position by
increasing Arab dependence on her for arms. Finally, the
psychological implications of the situation by 1970 were
such that many people in Israel were equating any disagree-
ment with the Israeli government abroad as anti-semi tism;
the Palestinians were talking of their own diaspora and vowing
to return if it took 1000 years; Arab politics and emotions
would not allow any Arab leaders to directly negotiate with
Israel. The super-powers were drawn into this caldron during
the 25 years from 1948 to 1973, slowly changing from interested
bystanders to verging on nuclear conflict during the October
war.
Super-power positions and considerations of the Arab-
Israeli conflict entering the decade of the 70 's should be
summarized, if changes due to the October war are to be pro-
perly highlighted. Since the 1950 's Soviet policy in the
Arab world has followed three broad areas — political align-
ment with radical Arab regimes, arming and rearming those
regimes following defeats, and providing economic assistance
1
8
to them. After 1967, Soviet military personnel also
18Lenczowski, George, Soviet Advances in the Middle East ,
p. 159, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D. C, 1972
22

undertook defensive roles within Egypt. As of the death of
Abd al Nasir (September 1970) , the Soviet position in the
Middle East was steadily improving. The USSR had acquired
air and naval bases in Egypt and port rights in at least 5
other countries. To be sure, this new position had brought
19
increased risk of conflict with Israel and the US. The
Arab states, none the less, expected continued Soviet support
in increasing amounts, on favorable terms while yielding
2 n
only minimal concessions. It was possible to ask, 'Who
was exploiting whom?"
21 The USSR in all probability did not
relish this situation, recognizing that "alternatives are:
22
a political settlement or a military clash." The ability
of the USSR to affect the policy of the Arab states was, how-
ever, not substantial. For example, although Syria and Iraq
were heavily dependent upon Soviet support, both refused to
go along with the USSR in supporting either UN Resolution 242
or the 1970 war of attrition ceasefire. The USSR hoped
these would reduce the rapidly escalating conflict and counter'
act the growing impression in the Arab world that the US
19Friedman, Robert O., Soviet Policy Toward the Middle_
East Since 1970 , p. 33, Praeger Press, New York, 1975.
20Klieman, A. S., Soviet Russian and the Middle East ,
p. 78, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970.




22Nikitina, G., The State of Israel, p. 361, Progress
Publishers from Pravda 28 February 1971, Moscow, 1973.
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might be changing its role to one more suitable to the Arab
cause. Finally, growing disunity in the Arab camp and the
absence of Abd al Nasir (on whom Soviet policy had rested
for over a decade) presented growing problems to Soviet
23policy makers as 1971 approached.
The United State's role in the conflict began in sub-
stance during the immediate post World War II period with
strong support for increased Jewish refugee immigration to
24Palestine. President Truman, thus, began his rise as a
most unpopular US leader, in the Arab view, when he stated:
"I believe that and urge that substantial immigration
into Palestine cannot await a solution to the Palestine
problem and that it should begin at once. Preparations
for this movement have already been made by this
government and it is ready to lend immediate assistance."
Next the US supported the UN Partition Plan and recognized
25
23
Op. cit. , Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since
1970
, p. 34.
24American influence in the Middle East had previously
been limited to missionary efforts such as the American
University of Beirut, World War I policy statements, and
studies such as the King-Crane Commission. Recognizing
British supremacy in the area, American had largely ignored




H. S. Truman statement 4 October 1946, author's
emphasis, quoted from: Williams, W. A., America and the
Middle East, p. 42, Rinehart & Co., New York, 1958.
24

Israel within minutes after its declaration. Progressing
into the cold war era, US policy settled down to simply
opposing Soviet inroads, although in the 1956 war she sided
with the USSR to restrict the efforts of the Anglo-French-
Israeli invasion forces. The cold war mentality of the US
policy, as expressed by Dulles and the Eisenhower doctrine,
unfortunately created hostility amongst many Arabs who saw
Zionism/Israel as a far greater threat than communism. This
hostility was also exploited by the Soviets who labeled the
Eisenhower doctrine as a new American colonialism, a view
2 6
many Arabs were willing to accept. Thus, although the
doctrine did provide a basis for active American participa-
tion in the area, it was not suited to meet the developing
27problems in the region. The development of a power vacuum
in the area following 1948, the 1956 war, the Lebanese inter-
vention, and economic interests in oil, drew the US into
greater involvement in the area. The US was forced to simul-
taneously attempt to underwrite Israel's existence, limit
Soviet gains in the area and present an objective face
toward the Arab countries with the latter effort definitely
in last priority.
2 f\
Bose, T. C. , The Superpowers and the Middle East
,
p. 47, Popular Press, Bombay, India, 1972.
27 Ibid., p. 49.
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The elements of the conflict in Palestine entering the
decade of the seventies were, thus, a complex melange of
issues whose opposing sides seemed to be stiffening in posi-
tion and intensifying in hostility. Super-power involvement
in this conflict was largely limited to supplying arms to
their respective clients and playing a zero sum game of
countering each other's influence in the area. Due concern
was given to each other's interest, but little high level
effort was directed at moving the Arabs and Israelis in the
direction of a comprehensive settlement of the conflict.
Elements of change, however, were beginning to surface (such
as the Palestinians becoming so spectacular as to defy being
ignored), but in the perceptions of leaders in the early 1970'
s
another major war in the Middle East could only result in a
complete replay of previous conflicts. The preconditions that
developed for the 197 3 war contained some unusual components
which should be considered in detail as must the war itself.
26

III. THE OCTOBER WAR - PRECONDITIONS
The thirteen months from August 1969 thru September 1970
formed a watershed from which history slid rapidly toward the
October war. During this period Palestinian guerrilla activi-
ties peaked and waned, the US put forth a plan for a compre-
hensive solution, Soviet pilots began flying combat missions
over the Suez, Abd al Nasir died and with his passing the
Soviet presence in Egypt became progressively less secure.
Super-power interest in the Middle East, however, apparently
became of lesser importance as the distractions of detente,
Vietnam, and internal pressures grew.
To the Arabs, the pressures of these events added new
conditions to the open sore of defeat in 1967 and should,
therefore, be given some considerations. Egyptian-Soviet
relations from al Nasir 's death to the October war remain
somewhat of an enigma of which at least two distinct analy-
ses exist. The majority (or perhaps most frequently encoun-
tered) view is that following the death of al Nasir, Soviet
influence began to drop sharply because al Nasir' s intense
personal humiliation following the 1967 war had made him
willing to make major concessions to the Soviets in order to
acquire the weapons necessary to recross the Suez. Soviet
assistance to al Nasir, however, included restricting Soviet
personnel and modern equipment to defensive roles. Exclusive
27

Soviet enclaves were established in Egypt and resentment
against Soviet methods, attitudes, and restrictions began to
mount. Al Nasir's successor, Muhammed Anwar al Sadat, began
to feel that the Soviets were supporting Ali Sabry against
him. He was, furthermore, concerned by the communist supported
coup in the Sudan. In early 1971 al Sadat moved to strengthen
his internal position by removing Ali Sabry and the chief
of the secret police. When the Soviet Union disregarded
these changes (at least publicly) , and pressed for the Soviet-
Egyptian Friendship Treaty in late May, many Egyptians
believed that the Soviets did earnestly support a canal
crossing and had agreed to avoid negotiations with the US
behind Egypt's back. By the spring of 1972, however, al
Sadat had become disallusioned due to Soviet reluctance to
provide certain weapons and continued Soviet dealings with
the US. After first warning the Soviets, he expelled the
2 8
majority of Soviet personnel in the summer of 1972. He
then moved to organize the Egyptian military for the October
war beginning in late 1972 with the appointment of Ismail
29All as war minister. The minority view of these events
2 8
Ra'anan, Uri, "Soviet Decision Making in the Middle
East", found in Soviet Naval Policy — Objectives and Constraints ,
ed. by Michael McGwire, Ken Booth, John McDonnel, p. 184,
Praeger Press, New York, 1975. See also Op., cit. , Soviet
Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970 .
29
A. S. Sadat, 7 October 1974, FBIS 11 October 1974.
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holds that the apparent reversal in Soviet presence in
Egypt was essentially a Soviet decision based on internal
Soviet politics whose considerations were — avoidance of
another defeat of Soviet arms, a desire to avoid an open
conflict with the US, and dissatisfaction with trends in
Egyptian politics. The Soviets, therefore, decided to with-
draw Soviet combat personnel from Egypt and prepare to
support the reopening of Arab-Israeli conflict, as they had
in the past in an attempt to reemphasize the necessity of
30their support to the Arabs.
Regardless of the degree of accuracy in either view,
neither represents, sufficiently, the importance of internal
Arab problems and politics. These can be shown to have been
a major determinant in the decision to launch the October
attack. Most Arab thinking by 1970 agreed on the necessary
31
elements in redressing the balance against Israel. Actual
accomplishments in this regard would require more effective
Syrian-Egyptian coordination than had as yet been possible.
The near simultaneous accession to power in both Egypt and
Syria of relatively moderate leaders (al Sadat and al Asad)
30Op. cit. , Soviet Naval Policy — Objectives and Constraints ,
p. 200-201, 205.
31Undoubtedly the more radical Palestinian elements
believed that the guerrilla was the only hope after the 1967
war, but most believed that any substantial achievements
would require the active participation of the Arab states,
particularly Syria and Egypt.
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who not only considered a pragmatic approach to the overall
situation but also emphasized an Islamic approach toward day-
to-day affairs, made the attack possible. There are several
reasons for this, namely rising internal and Palestinian
radicalism due to the 1967 war, internal economic presures,
internal competitive political pressure, external relation-
ships with other Arab states and finally perceptions of non-
Arab international events. While the exact priority of these
factors cannot be properly assessed within the scope of this
paper, it is likely that Syrian and Egyptian internal and
inter-Arab pressures were of the type which could have led
directly to the overthrow of either al Sadat or al Asad and
were, therefore, of greater significance to them. In any
event, the pragmatic responses to these various pressures
led not only to Syrian-Egyptian cooperation militarily but
also to a situation which made the economic power of the
conservative oil rich states available providing financial
and political support while retaining the modern military
capabilities obtained from the USSR.
During the final twelve months prior to the October war
the operation of the foregoing factors may be clearly seen
in the following events. In Egypt, the replacement of General
Sadiq and many other senior officers on 26 October led to
32intense protests from the army (which had been one of the
32Arab World Weekly, 22 January 1972, and An Nahar Arab
Report, 26 February 1973.
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pillars on which Sadat had been basing his power) . Economic
restrictions were put in effect in late 1972 and an ambitious
development plan proclaimed in 1973 on top of continued ex-
pense for the military. Sadat himself, recognized that the
33
economic pressure of continued mobilization was untenable.
In Syria a similar situation persisted involving religious
conflicts and splits within the military. Moderation of the
state secularism and inclusion of Islam as the religion of
the state was, however, apparently sufficient cause for the
34Saudis to provide money for military assistance. Coordina-
tion of Egyptian-Syrian planning for the attack as the only
viable response to these various pressures was underway by
the spring of 1973 but serious obstacles remained in addition
to purely military considerations. The strategic position of
Jordan and its extremely poor relationship with the Pales-
tinian resistance (since 1970) promised to be a problem which
was not satisfactorily resolved until shortly before the war.
Finally, if the strategy of winning at least a victory (if
35
not a war) was to succeed, coordinated action by all of the
major Arab oil producing states would be required to reinforce
the political implications of any victory. Finally, the
33FBIS, 27 August 1974.
Arab Report and Record, 1-15 April 1972, 10 million pound:
35First set forth by Haykal, Publisher of Al Aram in Arab
World Daily, 11 April 1969.
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maximum possible diplomatic position of Muslim states not
directly involved with the conflict, particularly Iran and
Turkey, would be valuable to Egypt and Syria both during the
war and in the negotiations following the war. Efforts to
achieve these ends were conducted throughout 19 73, the results
of which and accuracy of the perceptions which generated
them would become clear in the following months.
Israeli perceptions and policies during the immediate
pre-war period were heavily colored by the leftover impact
of the 1967 war. Secure in the perception of unquestioned
Israeli military supremacy, the government and society con-
centrated on internal problems, of which there was no shortage
Tourism was booming, including, ironically and perhaps signi-
ficantly for the future, approximately 150,000 Arabs in
3 61972-73. Both Gaza and West Bank economies were heavily
involved with Israel (and began to be after the war as well)
with significant numbers of Palestinians working in Israel,
taking their wages back to the Gaza and West Bank, there
37purchasing goods frcm Israel. Internationally, the Israelis
felt that super-power activity in the Middle East represented
more of what had become a familiar littany of words, which





could be ignored, and actions (primarily arms agreements)
,
which could not be ignored. In this atmosphere, there was
little Israeli incentive to seriously consider any option,
other than the status quo that had so many economic and
political benefits to the majority of Israel's citizenry. To
be sure, there did exist a group in Israel that pointed to
the large Arab populations in the West Bank and Gaza as
insoluable problems due to sheer numbers (approaching 1/3
of the entire population of Israel) , but this group was
3 8
overwhelmed by the optimistic status quo majority. That
this view prevailed was not entirely due to the external
Arab-Israeli relationship, but was also related to internal
Israeli societal conditions.
Since the creation of modern Israel, the society had been
undergoing a steady change (see Appendix A, Table 5) . In
19 4 8 more than half of the population had been born in Europe,
over a third was native born and only the remaining (less
than 10%) percentage came from Asian or African countries.
By 19 72, the European and American born were less than 30%
of the population. Half (48%) of the population was native
born (of whom many were of Sephardic descent due to a higher
birthrate) but Asian and African born Jews now represented
38Monroe, E., Farrar-Hockley , A. H., "Arab-Israel War,
October 1973, Background and Events", Adelphi Paper #111 ,




nearly 25% of Israel's population. This quantitative change
in favor of the Sephardi or Oriental was not accompanied by
commensurate qualitative changes in Sephardic living stan-
dards which remained relatively low compared to the European
Jew. Communal stresses (in the form of riots) first surfaced
in 1959 and by 1971 were visible in the protest of the Black
Panthers, a group of violent Sephardic youth. To be sure,
the violence and political visibility of this discontent is
minimal compared to many Western societies where ethnic
40differences and economic differences coincide. Neverthe-
less, when it became evident in the 1967 war that the Sephardic
Jew not only placed his loyalty to Israel above ethnic con-
siderations but was able to credibly perform the various
defence tasks, many Israelis (perhaps in a collective sign
of relief) came to the conclusion that the Orientals now felt
they were a full part of the society and were accepted by
the Europeans. Various studies indicate that these views
41
may not have been as a result of any substantive change.
A typical Israeli, of European extraction, holding this view
39Peretz , Don, "Israeli Diversity", The Middle East Quest
for an American Policy , ed. by W. A. Be ling, State University
of New York Press, Albany, p. 74-75, 1973. Also op. cit.,










would logically tend to support the status quo political
view since it not only minimized the significance of the
internal dissension, but also focused on the one element of
substantial agreement, namely hard line defense.
The sum of Arab and Israeli perceptions can, thus, be
seen as having led to the 1973 war. On the one hand, the
situation was intolerable to the major Arab states and on
the other, the status quo position in Israel precluded any
progress diplomatically. The overwhelming need for movement
versus a lack of positive motivation for movement coupled
42
with super-power inaction or more appropriately priority
concerns elsewhere made another round of the conflict certain
The conflict when it came, was to radically alter the overall
equation of growing hardness on both sides.
42Sadat stated in a March 1974 Time interview that the
May 197 2 detente between the US and the USSR had "put our




(See Appendix E for chronology of events)
"The strategic aim ... is ... as follows: ... to
inflict the heaviest losses on the enemy to convince
him that his continued occupation of our territory
imposes on him a price which he cannot pay, and
consequently, defying the Israeli theory of security
based on psychological, political, and military
armament, showing him that this is not a steel shield
that can protect him now or in the future. If we
succeed . .
.
, this will lead to certain results in
the short and in the long run. "43
The above guidance to the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief
indicates that the Ramadan War was not undertaken simply as
a military adventure but as an integral part of a plan to
move the Middle East, from its stalemate, in a direction
favorable to Arab goals.
What specifically did occur during October 1973 that
bears on Sadat's strategic aims? As may be seen above,
Operation Badr aimed at conveying psychological and political
messages to the Israelis and the world. At least three actual
messages were conveyed. First, initial Arab military
successes demonstrated a substantial capability to not only
operate modern weaponry but also to plan, coordinate and
conduct large scale operations. When combined with the




numerical superiority of the Arabs over Israel, this demonstra-
tion can only have an ominous impact upon the future of the
conflict. Secondly, political messages were conveyed, pri-
marily by the oil embargo, which brought home to the modern
world the stark reality of the crucial importance of the Middle
East. Finally, the interaction of the two super-powers during
the conflict generated awareness in each that the pre-war
status quo held dangers that were greater than either (or
at least the US) was willing to risk. The relative signifi-
cance of these messages varies widely with the beholder and
coming to grips with them at all is heavily dependent upon the
perspective of the viewer. If the impact of the war on
super-power policy is to be properly assessed, each of these
concepts must be seen as viewed by the two super-powers.
The USSR, regardless of its position in the immediate
pre-war time frame obviously had prior knowledge of the con-
44flict. Whether the USSR was advised by the Arabs, actively
participated in the planning, or simply detected and recognized
45
the upcoming event in intelligence, is unknown. Removal
44See Section III and Appendix F.
^5Western and Israeli intelligence agencies did not believe
hostilities were eminent until immediately prior (within 10
hours in the Israeli case — Agranat Commission Report Summary,
Aviation Week and Space Technology , "Both Sides of Suez",
p. 26, November 1975) and in some cases after the initial
attack (New York Times, October 31, p. 1, col. 5, 1973).
Soviet intelligence, however, did have the advantage of being
in position to directly observe what was happening in the Arab
countries. Certain Soviet reactions such as in-flight divert
of Soviet aircraft to pick up personnel are more typical of




of Soviet citizens from the area began prior to the attack,
resupply of Egypt and Syria began within 48 hours of the
attack and initial UN attempts at a ceasefire were thwarted.
By October 19th, Soviet resupply efforts were on a massive
scale and within a week after the initial hostilities the
Soviet navy had moved to counter the 6th Fleet. Finally, as
the Arabs begin to fare poorly, the USSR shifted to support
of a ceasefire and then to demanding one backed by a threat
of unilateral intervention. Once again, whether these actions
46
were according to Ra'anan's Brezhnev Plan (see Appendix F)
,
or resulted from an opportunistic decision within the Soviet
Defense Council as the crisis developed, is not of signifi-
cance here. What is crucial is that for the first time in
modern Middle East history, the USSR was moving within a
war in an attempt to secure a favorable outcome rather than
reacting to an outcome. As a minimum, this is seen as a
bottom line of Soviet policy — refusal to see the destruction
of a client state or even a catastrophic defeat of a client's
armed forces. The element of Soviet power as exercised to
accomplish these aims during the war, range from logistic
47
to military (naval suasion and threatened air-land
46
Op. cit., Soviet Naval Polic y, p. 205.
Term, naval suasion, taken from Lutwak, The Political
Uses of Sea Power
, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,
1974. Soviet naval actions encompassed nearly all of the
potential variations of naval suasion discussed therein.
See charts on p. 6 and p. 74.
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intervention) , to diplomatic maneuvering with the nations
in conflict, bilaterally with the US, and internationally
in the UN.
The Soviet motivation to conduct these operations is by
no means insignificant. Because of the concern their moves
generated, culminating in a nuclear confrontation with the
US, the possible gain from those moves must have appeared
to have been very great. The results of this effort, however,
if viewed in the context of the Middle East alone, netted
very few substantive gains for the USSR. In fact, it may be
said that the USSR lost ground vis-a-vis the overall Arab
community, particularly with Egypt. Why then did the Soviets
4 8 . .
make the effort? Several possible explanations exist.
(1) Miscalculation — the USSR simply did not recognize the
changes taking place within the Middle East and was moving
to minimize any possible criticism which could be leveled
against it by the Arabs; (2) Planned support of an agreed
move — the USSR agreed to support the entire war effort,
recognizing that it could incur losses, but felt that the
potential to be gained from a reopened Suez in Arab hands
4 8
It should be noted that at the time, as the war itself
progressed, substantial gains seemed to be accruing to the
USSR. (1) The Arab unity displayed by the oil embargo
sharply attacked the US Middle East position; (2) Soviet
arms were performing well; (3) The Soviet position as cham-
pion of the Arab cause was resumed, reversing the verbal
attacks that had been ongoing with Egypt since the 1972
expulsion/departure of Soviet troops.
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and secure Soviet positions in Syria and Iraq outweighed
the risks; and (3) A larger context — the USSR viewed the
Middle East October War not as an isolated crisis area, but
as an opportunity to enhance or demonstrate its overall stra-
tegic position vis-a-vis the United States; (4) Some combina-
tion of the foregoing. Judging by the changing Soviet actions
during the war and the rapid shift in the overall balance
49following the war, it seems highly unlikely that the USSR
was playing an agreed role of a preconceived plan. A combina-
tion of muddling through (albeit with skill, daring, and
determination) along the line of explanations (1) and (3)
seems to be the most logical answer to the question of Soviet
moves during the war itself.
When viewed from the United States, the events of the
October War displayed tremendous problems of several types
and simultaneously created both the motivation and opportunity
for new or, at least, dramatically altered US role in the
area. US policy initiatives in the Middle East since the
failure of the Rodgers Plan had been an on again, off again
50(mostly off) and somewhat uncoordinated effort. Secretary
of State Kissinger had by the fall of 1973, opened talks
49Sadat interview in Al Anwar, 29 March 1974, taken from
H. Tanner article, New York Times, 30 March 1974.
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with Arabs at the UN aimed at beginning wider negotiations
51following the Israeli elections. Kissinger recognized
before the war that another conflict, if prolonged, could
52
create a "high possibility of great power involvement."
It is not surprising then that he quickly realized that the
war, once started, was of crucial importance and that US
decisions taken during the war must be taken with a view
53towards a managed settlement that would aid in continuing
those negotiations. In the process of this effort, five key
decisions were made which structured the conclusion of the
war and enabled the events of the upcoming months. The
decisions were: (1) resupply of Israel (2) emergency requests
to Congress for $2.2 billion aid for Israel (3) cooperate
with USSR in imposing a ceasefire as the war moved against
the Arabs, (4) pressuring Israel to allow resupply of the
Egyptian 3rd Corps (5) world-wide alert. The purpose of
54these decisions, as outlined by N. Safran was to establish
a negotiating situation by conveying several messages. The
5L.,
Ibid.
52Washington Post, 26 September 1973.




54Safran, Nadav, "Engagement in the Middle East",




first through the fourth were intended to (A) convey to the
Israelis (in view of the Arabs) , that the US was willing to
ensure Israeli security but did not believe in an imposition
of Israeli will on the Arabs and (B) to demonstrate to the
Arabs (in view of the Israelis) , that they could not achieve
their goals by force, although the US was not interested in
seeing them humiliated or again defeated. The fifth decision
was meant to neutralize any Soviet interference with the
communication of the foregoing messages
.
Safran's analysis doesn't credit the full impact of Soviet
moves because the fifth decision would very likely not have
been made were it not for the United States' perception that
Soviet threat to intervene unilaterally in the conflict was
credible. It is more likely that the US alert was an attempt
to save some US potential out of what seemed to be a very
pro-Soviet turn of events. That the US actions in Israel
following the alert conveyed the other messages is highly
probable. The final event, the alert, could have, however,
conveyed some extremely undesirable messages since it could
have appeared as the only possible way for the US to save
face while giving way to a Soviet ultimatum. This has been
suggested by the former US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
55Zumwalt. This possibility, while it should not be overlooked
55Adm. Zumwalt 's view of the US alert, put forth in numer-
ous interviews following his retirement, has been accused of
being politically motivated by Secretary Kissinger.
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in overall US-Soviet relations, has not had any apparent
impact on the Middle East, perhaps because of the success
of the first two messages. Another possibility which should
not be overlooked is that the personal diplomatic contact
during the war between Kissinger, al Sadat and Mrs. Meir
concentrated or focused the exchange on the direct issue
between the Israelis and Arabs, effectively screening out the
US-Soviet confrontation that was developing. That this per-
sonal contact on both sides was significant during the war is
reflected by Sadat's October statement that "the US is playing
56
a constructive role" while Israeli Prime Minister Meir
A • • 1 4-4- 4- 57 58issued a similar statement.
The net effect, however, of the involvement and inter-
action of the super-powers on a global scale combined with
the military and political actions of the Arab states and
Israel had created a new equation or process of events which
could not have occurred had the war not progressed as it did.
This new equation hinged primarily upon war induced changes
in the overall perception of the situation by Western, Arab,
56FBIS, 18 October, 1973.
Ibid.
5 8The impact key personalities had in creating the post-
war euphoria (of the possibility of rapid progress to a
settlement) will be analysed in Section V.
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and Israeli leaders. Naturally, it is extremely unlikely
that all of the various leadership had the same views on
each of the following conditions. This is particularly true
concerning the relative significance of each, but, neverthe-
less, it is likely that the following perceptions had or were
59
emerging by the end of the immediate post-war period.
(1) The oil embargo had demonstrated a degree of Arab unity
heretofore believed impossible, its impact had illuminated the
vulnerability of all industrial states and the enourmous
economic leverage of the Arab states. Side effects of this
vulnerability made direct inroads on Japan and on the European
states' (and therefore NATO's) attitude toward the continuance
of conflict in the Middle East since in the scramble to insure
adequate energy supplies, it became obvious that future con-
flicts could result in even more devastating economic impact.
Motivation to prevent the conflict, thus, rose dramatically.
(2) The initial performance of Arab armies, under moderate
political leadership, had restored the personal honor of Arabs
throughout the world. The cry "now we can talk" was enabled
by the initial successes and clearly capable performance of
the regular armed forces, both Egypt and Syria. The same
performance had demonstrated to the world (and particularly
Israel) that continued Israeli successes or superiority were
59Defined as prior to the Israeli-Egyptian Disengagement
Agreement of 18 January 1974.
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not necessarily foregone conclusions and traditional princi-
ples of war such as surprise, operated against as well as
for the Israelis. The Suez Canal was a logical, militarily
defensible border and it had been crossed. What then was
the value of holding out for geographical "secure" borders
since it had been demonstrated that intentions and attitudes
of the surrounding Arab states did count after all? Continuing
this logic, since those states had been emphasizing the key
importance of the Palestinians for several years, was it not
logical to conclude that perhaps they were serious about
this element of the conflict as well? (3) Israeli dependence
upon the US had been highlighted both by the Arab efforts and
the US resupply efforts. US recognition and demonstration
of its concern both for its interest in supporting Israel and
its interest in the Arab side, achieved a movement of the
balance which was one of the initial goals of al Sadat.
(4) US-Soviet confrontation over the developing conflict had
demonstrated that the Soviets were willing to go to greater
lengths than had been widely assumed and that continued con-
flict in the Middle East held not just potential stress for
the detente process, but danger of actual direct US-Soviet
conflict. Since the latter possibility would represent a
new element in the now standardized client, state support
form of super-power competition, both super-powers had new
interest in cooperation (at least superficially) in the area.
45

The foregoing perceptions, taken together, created a
situation in which most of the participants in the Middle
East arena desired substantive progress toward a settlement
and the remainder felt they were not in position to protest,
at least until the direction of that movement became apparent
In such a situation, particularly when following closely
on the heels of an extremely tense confrontation, emotions
tend to produce an even more favorable impression of events
than is justified. This quirk of human nature may account
for the near euphoric period that Western and Arab press




Institutionalized Change or Individual Glory
On the 12th of November 1973, the day after the ceasefire
implementation agreement was signed at Kilometer 101 on the
Sinai front, Prime Minister Heath of Great Britain told Prime
Minister Meir of Israel that "we believe there now exists a
real opportunity, the first perhaps for many years, to convert
truce and ceasefire into permanent settlement and lasting
peace." A few days later the editor of Al Ahram quoted
Kissinger as saying "the Soviet Union can give Egypt arms
but the US is able to give it a just peace which would allow
C
"J
the recovery of occupied territory."
In the months following these optimistic statements, the
hopes of the world grew (and so did the lines at Western gas
stations) as the ceasefire was followed by the first stage
disengagement on the Sinai (18 January 1974), official reopening
of US-Egyptian diplomatic relations (28 February 1974) , the
Statement closing UK-Israeli discussions on the Middle
East quoted from: Middle East Economic Digest
, p. 1504, 28
December 1973.
fi 1
Kissinger's statement allegedly made during his 5-16
November 1973 tour of the Middle East countries was quoted
from: Middle East Economic Digest




easing of the embargo (19 March 1974) , and the Syrian cease-
fire (31 May 1974). These events, a steady progression of
impossible accomplishments coming roughly a month apart,
formed a seemingly irresistable peace locomotive fueled by
the motivation of the October War and unerringly engineered
by Henry Kissinger's shuttle. This impression of everything
is all right now, the new US role will solve everything was
not limited to somewhat fickle journalists and graduate stu-
dents, tough businessmen, as reflected by the Wall Street
Journal , also loaned their influential views to the belief.
That the US was simultaneously involved in a deep internal
crisis seemed to have no effect on the apparent progress
that was being made. To be sure, the shifts that the various
accords reflected were significant steps but were they, as
many believed at the time, the result of dynamic US -Middle
East policies or something else?
Cairo radio, in commenting on the reopening of US diplo-
matic relations indicated that Egypt was proceeding in a




, which caused a historic transformation in the
Seven Arab states announced the end of the oil restric-
tions on that date.





situation in the Middle East." Little mention was made
of US foreign policy except that President al Sadat said
that it is "tantamount to showing good will, and this paved
65
the way for the restoration of relations." In other words,
the US was simply reacting to the changed situation created
by the war rather than acting on any new policies. Cairo
continued to link a final peace accord (as it does today)
with the rights of the Palestinians and the return of occu-
pied Arab lands. All of the agreements at that time (and
at this writing as well) addressed only disengagements that
resulted in the return of relatively minor amounts of terri-
tory to Arab states. ' The euphoric mood, then, in Western
and Arab capitlas seemed to be based on separate impressions
of the same events.
This disparity was also evident in the view toward the
"other" super-power. In most Western capitals, the USSR had
been sinking fast in the wake of US increasing influence in
the Middle East, this was not entirely the case in the Arab
world. In late February of 1974, Soviet Foreign Minister
64Abd al Fattah Hilal commentary , Cairo Domestic Service




The Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement had left
Egypt in control of the Suez, undoubtedly a significant
financial and symbolic area, but still minute compared to
the total still held by Israel.
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Gromyko visited Arab capitals shortly after one of Kissinger's
visits. Jordan's news service Cir'Ra'y commented that the
"Soviet Foreign Minister's visit to Damascus immediately
following the visit of the US Secretary of State gives a
new impression of Soviet support for the mission assigned to
f\ "7
the US Secretary of State." This commentary shows that
while the US may have been playing a more glamorous role,
there existed an impression of at least, tacit Soviet support
for that role. In reality, the USSR was working hard to
regain lost ground, playing down the significance of the
Kissinger moves, urging Arab states to maintain the embargo.
The results of these efforts was a natural Soviet drift
toward the more radical Middle East states who were sympa-
thetic toward actions of this sort. This movement toward
the radical camp tended to drive the moderate elements in
the Middle East even closer to the US since the moderate
leaders were now able to demonstrate substantive gains by
breaking from the pattern of outbidding (or simple opposition
to Israel) and taking on the role of successful statesmen.
After all, it was moderate leadership, both in the war and
the diplomacy that followed, that resulted in the first return
of any Arab lands. This fact enormously strengthened the
67
Amman Domestic Service, in Arabic, 0510 GMT, 28 February
1974, in FBIS, 1 March 1974, p. dl.
6 Q
Wall Street Journal, p. 1, 24 May 1974.
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internal position of al Sadat and al Assad in their own
countries and throughout the Arab world. It also, perhaps
unfortunately, reinforced the expectations of the world that
substantive progress towards a final solution was imminent.
One element of the euphoria seemed to be agreed on by
all sides of the issue, the role of Secretary Kissinger as
the crisis manager extraordinare, whose touch never failed.
"He even brought the rain to Spain" (literally a drought
69
ended as he landed) , commented one analyst. Obviously
Kissinger was not a product of the October War, obviously
he was accomplishing a great deal. Where did the impact of
the war stop and Kissinger's magical presence start? Was
Kissinger's personal presence the catalyst that enabled move-
ment or was (is) he a skilled artisan leading a remodeled US
foreign policy apparatus newly responsive to a changing world?
Kissinger himself seems to believe the latter. He has stated
that "when I came in, I deliberately set myself the task of
trying to turn the Department of State into an instrument
that can serve succeeding presidents and succeeding secre-
70taries of state." Since the organization of the State
69Keatley, Robert, Wall Street Journal
, p. 6, 11 January 1974
70Interview of Secretary of State Kissinger by James
Reston, originally published by the New York Times , 13 October
1974. Quoted from Department of State Office of Media Services
Release, US Government Printing Office 584-229/4, p. 7, 1974.
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Department had been aimed at the use of cables, that is,
day to day tactical decisions, Kissinger first concentrated
on reorientation of the organization toward conceptual
71
national policy emphasizing the Policy Planning Staff.
He does admit that "individual tours de force by Secretaries
of State can be counter-productive if they don't leave a
72tradition behind." The parties involved in the various
agreements had a different view of the Secretary's role, al
Sadat said "by all standards, Dr. Kissinger has once again
73performed a miracle." The PLO Executive Committee said
that "Kissinger utilized all his skill ..., depending on
several realities which provided him with the opportunity for
74
success." It would seem that the institutionalization
deemed important by the Secretary of State was not too evi-
dent at the time (mid 1974) , rather the individualization of
negotiation was occurring. In fairness, it should be pointed
out that some institutionalization of US-Middle East relation-
ships was occurring at this time in the formation of the Joint
71 Ibid., p. 8.
72
' Ibid.
73Sadat commenting on the Syrian-Israeli Disengagement
Agreement, Cairo Domestic Service, in Arabic, 1730 GMT, 30
May 1974. In FBIS p. dl, 31 May 1974.
74PLO Executive Committee Political Report, Baghdad,
2 June 1974. In FBIS, 3 June 1974.
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75Cooperation Commissions. Since the commissions' work will
7 fi
not become particularly evident until 1976, little substance
was visible at the time and the focus of the world's attention
fell on Kissinger personally.
The dangers present in an unrealistic mood occurring
over a period of time are manifold, however, in the case of
the 1973 Middle East War several distinct possibilities arose
which posed substantial problems for super-power policy makers
Rising expectations of the Arab side based on glorification
of the October War, that now the tide had turned, could lead
to a hardening of position believing that time was on their
side. Israeli concern that such a view by the Arab side was
forming could lead to hardening of their position and military
preparedness to ward off any Arab moves, if followed to its
fullest, this logic could lead to pressure for an Israeli
preemptive strike to destroy Arab armies. Continued negotia-
tions and agreements that focus only on military movement,
75From June to November 1974 Joint Commissions were
formed with five Middle East nations; Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Jordan, Israel and Iran. They are jointly chaired at the
cabinet level meeting regularly to discuss ways in which the
countries may work together to broaden the base of mutual
understanding and expand national contacts concerning trade,
investment, science f technology, education and cultural
exchange. Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services




studiously avoiding any discussion of the question of the
Palestinians would undoubtedly lead to protest by the Pales-
tinians that they were being sold out by the major Arab
states' internal political interests in regaining lost terri-
tory. This view would very likely be supported by the vocal
radical states and since Egypt and Syria continue to claim
the interest of the Palestinians as the key factor in their
policy, some response would have to be made.
While a case may be made for the post-war euphoria as
an accurate reflection of reality at the time, in light of
the breakdown that occurred after mid-1974 culminating with
the end of the shuttle in early 1975, it seems more likely
that major miscalculations were made concerning the overall
situation at the time. These miscalculations or mispercep-
tions contributed to the breakdown of the locomotive and
must be considered as an integral part of the impact of the





"Dr. Kissinger's mission ..., has been interrupted."
"The efforts, ... to reach a second disengagement agreement
7 8
..., have ended." "The step-by-step approach pursued by
the United States ... has suffered a setback. Now, ... the
Middle East issues have to be dealt with comprehensively,
79
under more difficult circumstances." These words from
Israel, Egypt, and the United States shocked the world and
created the unpleasant conjecture that it was still possible
that the Middle East could slip back into the old routine.
Both sides of the issue simultaneously accused the other of
obstinacy that had meant the end of the line for the nego-
tiations. "Kissinger's efforts have ended because of the
Israeli Government which insisted on certain demands which
Egypt has categorically rejected from the beginning." And
77Jerusalem Domestic Service, in Hebrew, 2200 GMT, 22
March 1975. In FBIS, p. n7 , 24 March 1975.
7 RStatement by Isma'il Fahrni, Cairo MENA, in English,
0709 GMT, 23 March 1975. In FBIS, p. d8 , 24 March 1975.
79 • •Statement by Secretary of State Kissinger beginning
26 March 1975 press conference, Washington, D. C., quoted
from Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services
Press Release, 172/51, p. 1.
80




"This rejection by Egypt" (of Israeli proposals) "precipi-
8
1
tated the break in the talks."
Although prospects of doom quickly formed in many quar-
ters, it is apparent that just as the previous euphoria had
not accurately reflected the actual situation a year earlier,
the shock of the breakdown was not the cataclysmic event it
appeared to be. Prior to considering the effect of the
breakdown, and the accompagning US reassessment of Middle
East policy, an insight into the overall situation in the
Middle East between mid-1974 and spring 1975 should be devel-
oped. Although the PLO had been active during the October
War, its role had been overshadowed by that of the regular
82
armies since they operated under Egypt's control. By
June of 1974, Arafat had recognized that the future potential
progress for the Palestinians lay in close cooperation with
Syria and Egypt. At that time the Palestinian National Coun-
cil, in its ten point program, decided that it would seek to
establish a national authority over any portion of Pales-
tinian land that could be liberated. When specifically asked
by Senator McGovern (D - S. D.) if this meant the West Bank
IDF Radio, in Hebrew, 2300 GMT, 23 March 1975, statement
by Dan Patir (advisor to the Prime Minister) . In FBIS, p.
n8, 24 March 1975.
82Yasir Arafat, 5 June 1974, address to Palestinian
National Council on Cairo MENA, 1840 GMT, 5 June 1974. In
FBIS 6 June 1974.
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and Gaza, and two mutually recognized states (Israel and Pales-
tine) , Arafat replied, "yes" and added that on the basis of
the Council's June 1974 decision "this meant that the PLO
O "D OA
would accept Israel's boundaries of 1967." Arafat's
reply to McGovern came several months after the PLO "Foreign
Minister" Qaddumi stated similar views following Arafat's UN
85
speech. The two statements, thus, indicate a relatively
stable, if not completely official, position for the PLO.
The position of the PLO with respect to cooperation with
Egypt and Sryia essentially set the stage for the Rabat Con-
ference of late 1974 where the PLO was recognized by the Arab
83
"Realities of the Middle East", report to Committee on
Foreign Relations United States Senate, 94th Congress, US
Government Printing Office, 52-743, Washington, D. C. p. 10,1975
84The report (above) was recommended to the author by a
Palestinian as a clear expression of PLO views. The quoted
replies to Senator McGovern 's questions have been condensed
into one sentence from several pages of discussion of the
entire conflict. Analysis of the entire report should be
carefully conducted to insure correct contextual understanding.
It is the author's understanding that: (a) Arafat's informal
reply to Senator McGovern represents the feeling of moderate
realistic elements within the PLO and should not be taken to
mean the entire spectrum of PLO opinion; furthermore, (b) recog-
nizing that due to internal political pressure within the PLO
and other radical Arab states, these moderate elements will
not in all cases be able to state their views in as clear and
positive a manner as the McGovern report. Western students
should, therefore, carefully scrutinize the contextual environ-
ment of PLO statements realizing that just as their own future
hopes and dreams may differ from probable resolutions, there
is a considerable difference between what an individual dreams
and what they are willing to peacefully accept.
85Farouk Qaddumi, Head of PLO Political Department, in
exclusive interview to J. R. Adams, published in the Wall




states as the "sole representative of the Palestinian people."
Due largely to the impact on Israeli politics, this unanimous
declaration by the Arab summit followed by Arafat's appearance
at the UN was viewed by many US analysts as a tremendous com-
plication of the negotiation process that had previously been
87progressing successfully. The rationale being that the
recognition of the PLO represented a hardening of the Arab
negotiating stance due to an Arab perception of dealing from
a position of strength, this in turn conflicted with Israel's
situation where Prime Minister Rabin's government held only
a narrow margin in the Knesset and could potentially fall
over the issue of dealing with the Palestinians.
The immediate impact of this situation on super-power
policies seemed to be a setback for the US efforts and repre-
sented a shift toward the more radical elements of the Arab
world as supported by the Soviet Union. Capitals all over
the world predicted a high possibility of another round of
conflict if the parties were unable to continue diplomatic
progress before spring 1975. Public opinion in Israel, stung
by the triple impact of the PLO's new status, renewed guerilla
attacks, and perceived erosion of US support, ran strongly
o c
Cairo, Akbar Al Yawm, in Arabic, 2 November 1974. In
FBIS, 8 November 1974.
87For example editorial by R. J. Levine, Wall Street Jour -
nal




in favor of hard line defenses and vigorous retaliation for
o o
attacks. The resolution of this gloomy outlook seemed to
become a goal of continued US diplomatic efforts. Secretary
Kissinger continued to schedule trips for early spring 1975
saying "we are still hopeful that progress can be made and
89believe it will be made." Various military analysts believed
that due to the concern generated by the October War and US
supply efforts, the Israeli armed forces were in substantially
better condition than they were during 1973 and that although
Syrian forces had been re-equipped, Egyptian forces were not
ready for a fifth round of conflict. The latter case (Egypt's
readiness) might, in fact, encourage a pre-emptive Israeli
90
attack on Syria if the negotiations stalled. This view was
also put forth by the PLO in late December 1974 with Arafat
going so far as to predict that if another conflict occurred
o o
Jerusalem Domestic Service, quoted in FBIS on 20 Novem-
ber 1974. Summarized major Israeli press commentary linking
Rabat, Arafat's UN speech, attacks at Bet She 'an and Ma'alot,
Under Secretary of State Sisco's statement to the effect that
the US considered the PLO as the roof organization of the
Palestinians. One notable exception to the general tone was
expressed by Dr. Nahum Goldman, President of the World Jewish
Congress, who said "Israel should ... set conditions for
negotiating with Arafat", "I told (Mrs. Meir) that the Pales-
tinians exist." The Times
, London, p. 1L, 19 November 1974.
89Secretary of State Kissinger quoted by Keatly and




90_. ., , .Ibid, p. 14.
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in the Middle East, a super-power engagement in the Medi-
terranean would also take place, possibly expanding to a
91
world war. Soviet-Egyptian talks preparatory to a pro-
posed Brezhnev trip to the Middle East (later cancelled)
stressed that progress could only be achieved at the Geneva
92Conference which should be commenced as rapidly as possible.
Apparently, however, the danger of another war and its
consequences was too great for all of the powers involved to
actually attempt a military solution. How close another ex-
change came to taking place is unknown but by late February
1975, Syrian President Assad in an interview to Newsweek
Magazine was making statements of a much less warlike tone
93than the generally accepted view only two months earlier.
Whether actually hopeful or not, the Middle East powers
elected to return to the shuttle rather than try the military
route. They returned to negotiations in March 1975 with
hardened resolve, perhaps due to the tension immediately
prior to the renewed efforts. At this time, the triumph of
91Voice of Palestine Radio, 28 December 1974. In FBIS,
30 December 1974.
92Cairo MENA, in Arabic, 30 December 1974. In FBIS, 31
December 1974.
93President Assad's comments to Newsweek have been hotly
debated with denials and charges as to specific content, what
is of significance here is the difference in tone which Secre-
tary Kissinger recognized as a "hopeful sign". From a press
conference, Washington, D. C, 25 February 1975.
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negotiations over war (if in fact it was) , was attributed
to an after effect of the 1973 War by Undersecretary of
State Sisco. Speaking on a nationally aired TV show, Sisco
stated that "we are where we are principally because that
October War, I think, did change the objective conditions
in the area." And "I really believe that each side is pretty
sick and tired of war. I think the principle moderate
leaders in the Arab world would like to find a way diplo-
matically. I think Israel would like to find an agreement
94
on the basis of diplomacy."
Within a week of Sisco' s remarks the shuttle was back
in operation, however, from the outset it was recognized by
many people involved with the negotiations that this time
the shuttle was facing greater obstacles because of the har-
dening position of both sides. President Sadat needed con-
tinuing progress, particularly a withdrawal of as much occu-
pied territory as possible, the Israelis were tying any signi-
ficant withdrawals to a political quid-pro-quo of some form
of non-belligerency by the Egyptians, precisely what the
Egyptians could least afford to concede since it would appear
to be the separate agreement that Syria and the PLO feared,
yet for Israel to settle for less would severely test the
94Bill Moyer's Journal, International Report, produced
by WNET/13, New York, 6 March 1975. Quoted from Department
of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media News
Services News Release, Washington, D. C, p. 6-7.
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government of Prime Minister Rabin. That the established
pattern of previous shuttles was unable to bring together
positions so substantially contradictory, is not particu-
larly surprising. With the assistance of hindsight, it may
be said that optimism expressed at the time was a combination
of relief over the willingness of the Middle. East states to
refrain from force and hope that the shuttle would work
another miracle. Since the previous miracles were not really
miracles but understandable derivatives of the situation,
the breakdown did not represent a substantial change in the
post-war equation. Rather it was a pause in which the Arabs
and Israelis could consider not. only the possible alternatives
to continued contacts but also ways in which the necessary
concessions (on both sides) could be made acceptable within
their respective internal political frameworks. The US
assessment of its Middle East policy, announced shortly after
the interruption of the shuttle placed pressure on both sides
of the conflict to re-examine their positions. This was
spelled out on national TV by Secretary Kissinger when he
declared that "All parties on both sides have an obligation
95to examine what they can do to produce peace." That both
sides apparently were doing so became obvious as the US
95Interview of Secretary of State Kissinger, Tuesday,
6 May 197 5, by Barbara Walters on NBC TV Today Show. Quoted
from Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Office
of Media Service Release, p. 5.
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reassessment continued while the world focus momentarily
shifted to the Helsinki Conference, by July 1975 the Secre-
tary of State was able to state "Egypt and Israel, in my
view are now both making serious efforts, . .., if the two
sides can survive each other's public statement, ... I
believe they are now beginning to talk ... in a negotiable
,.96
manner.
In fact, the breakdown had allowed several crucial steps
including strengthening of the internal position of Sadat
and Rabin by allowing both to appear firmly committed to the
philosophical goals of their respective camps. It had
tested and confirmed the new equation in the area resulting
from the 1973 War and thereby paved the way for a successful
second stage Sinai disengagement agreement acceptable to
both sides.
96Secretary of State Kissinger, press conference, Wash-
ington, D. C, 25 July 1975. Quoted from Department of
State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services
Release, PR387/64, p. 5.
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VII. THE SECOND SINAI DISENGAGEMENT
(See Appendix G for text of the agreement and map)
"The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall
97
not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means."
The first sentence of the first article of the September 1975
Agreement between Egypt and Israel may well mark a watershed
in the long term effort toward peace. It is a veritable
jewel in the crown of diplomatic art. While committing both
parties to peaceful effort, it does not constitute a separate
agreement relating to only Israel and Egypt but addresses
the entire Middle East conflict. It, thereofre, satisfies
the Israeli need for some form of nonbelligerance but does
not constitute an Egyptian renunciation of any of its commit-
98
ments to the other Arab states. The Agreement further
commits the two countries to reach a final and just peace
settlement based upon Security Council Resolution 338 of
October 22, 1973, jointly sponsored by the Soviet Union and
the United States. The Agreement, thus, committed the pres-
tige of both super-powers to its support, thereby calling
97The Agreement between the Government of the Arab Repub-
lic of Egypt and the Government of Israel, September 1, 1975,
Article 1. Quoted from the Department of State, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Office of Media Services Revised News Release,




for the agreement of the most diverse and powerful group
of states in modern Middle Eastern history. Unfortunately,
the Soviet Union boycotted the formal signing of the Agree-
ment allegedly because the Agreement brings in American
. . . 99technicians to monitor the early warning systems.
The Soviet response to the Agreement triggered an angry
response from al Sadat who claimed that Soviet action was
"a flagrant provocation and attempt to divide the Arab front."
Assuming that the Soviet action was an attempt to cut Soviet
prestige losses, moving closer to the radical Arab camp by
torpedoing the Agreement, what then was the motivation and
considerations of the other powers involved in the pact?
This question is particularly valid when it is considered
that the negotiations had come to a standstill only six months
earlier. All three nations receive benefits from the Agree-
ment and as well, assume risks which should be considered
individually prior to putting the whole together. Israel's
Prime Minister Rabin appeared to have gained considerable
political stature internally by his firm stance in the earlier
99Wall Street Journal , 5 September 1975.
100 T , .,Ibid.
Analysis of gains versus risks essentially taken from
an analysis by William Beecher, Boston Sunday Globe , 2




negotiations. This gave him considerably greater flexibility
in dealing with the overall problem than he had previously
102possessed. What he gained and the Knesset approved,
was time to pursue longer term agreements, firmed its rela-
tionship with the US including aid commitments of advanced
arms and its petroleum needs guaranteed. This may have
caused a break in the regular schedule of recurring wars in
which Israel can rebuild its sagging economy. Israel gained
the use of the Suez Canal for non-military cargoes. Con-
sidering the number of Egyptian civilians who will move into
the revitalized canal area, Israel has probably succeeded
in reducing the threat from the Egyptian front to very low
level. Finally, from a security point of view, the combina-
tion of buffer zones, regular US air reconnaissance, and US
monitored sensor fields means that the Israelis have lost
little militarily and may even have gained a certain amount.
Israeli risk is minimal militarily, another tank road exists
north of the passes which could be utilized by attacking
forces, but the terrain is such that command of the air is
a key factor to its use. Israel's aid commitments should
insure its capability in that respect.
102Knesset approved the Agreement by a vote of 70 - 43,
with seven abstentions. Three members of the ruling Labor
Party, including Mcshe Dayan, voted against the Agreement.
As reported in the Wall Street Journal




Egypt's gains are multiple, the territory recovered
has some military value but has great symbolic value, thereby
enhancing Sadat's internal position. The return of Abu
Rudeis will annually provide roughly 350 million dollars of
oil, but the most significant potential gain for Egypt is
the element of potential peace which will enable outside
investment to assist in the rebuilding of the economy, long
in need of revitalization. The risk for Egypt lies in the
political stress placed upon the fragile Arab unity. Radical
elements within the Arab camp consider the Agreement a sell-
out on Egypt's part and will intensify their efforts to
create incidents which will jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of the agreement thereby placing Sadat himself under
considerable pressure. Sadat is heavily dependent not only
upon continued progress in the overall situation, but also
replacing Soviet with Western arms — he may have burned his
bridges behind himself with respect to Soviet aid although
this could be resumed if he were willing to reverse his
current stand.
The United States is not, as some have put it, simply
paying for what Israel gives to Egypt, although the US
commitment does involve both US personnel injected into the




conflict. Nor does the US entry into the agreement seem
104
similar to the beginnings of another Vietnam. What the
US does gain is a substantial increase in prestige in Egypt
and the conservative Arab group led by the Saudis at the
expense of the Soviets. More importantly, the US gains a
commitment from both sides to refrain from the hostilities
that led to not only near open conflict with the USSR but
economic pressure in the form of the oil embargo. A recur-
rence of either could cause devastating economic reversals.
The cost of security assistance to both sides of the conflict
is minimal compared to the potential losses involved with
either an exchange with the Soviets or another embargo.
105Finally, the reopening of the Suez and its enlargement
to accommodate supertankers could bring the US substantial
strategic advantages since such a modernization would allow
103FY 76 Security Assistance Program allocates $3,383
million out of a world total of approximately $4,600 million
total to Middle East security assistance. Israel, Egypt,
Jordan and Syria are the primary recipients. Department of
State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Gist-Security Assistance,
December 1975.
104
US involvement in Vietnam was military support of one
side, the Middle East role is civilian and was requested by
both sides, in fact, the US presence is a key upon which
both parties of the agreement not only agree but insist upon
105Although not directly referred to in the Agreement,
the disengagement secures the canal, making investment in
its enlargement to accommodate large tankers feasible.
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Sixth Fleet carriers to pass, thereby greatly increasing US
naval flexibility of options in the entire Indian Ocean and
African area.
World-wide commentary over which nation gave-received-
risked-or-did not-risk will undoubtedly go on unabated until
some group of analysts gets the opportunity to say I told
you so. What is undeniable in the agreement is that for
the first time in modern Middle East history a document has
been produced where in if successful both parties stand to
gain more than either would gain if it were to fail. Secondly,
for the first time in modern Middle East history, two opposing
countries have agreed not only to disengage but to seek a
just and durable peace by peaceful means. Finally, they have
agreed on a Joint Group to assist in the implementation
of the accord, another beginning. In other words, for the
first time a step has been made that addresses one of the
key elements of the overall problem. To be sure, the criti-
cal issues of the overall problem have not been addressed,
however, as may be seen by the complexity of the Agreement,
annex and protocols to the Agreement, the magnitude of the
overall problem is massive. It is, therefore, understandable
that all would not be addressed given the sensitivity and
intensity of the situation. What is of significance is that
Article VI of the Agreement. See Appendix G
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in the situation following the October War, the major opponents
107have twice gone to the brink of war, considered the options
and decided against the military option. What this demon-
strates is that clearly in the eyes of both sides the poten-
tial gains versus risks involved in a negotiated settlement
outweigh the gains versus risks of a military effort. The
second stage disengagement agreement further indicates that
the political climate within Israel and Egypt are such that
the government leaders have sufficient internal strength
and flexibility that they are able to overcome internal
opposition to achieve some progress toward their respective
perception of what a complete settlement may include. Real-
istically, at this point, the impact of the other elements
of the Middle East equation must be considered.
Considering that the September 1975 Agreement was a for-
ward step with respect to Israel and Egypt which had inciden-
tal benefits for US policy to the detriment of the USSR, what
does the future hold for the Middle East powers with respect
to super-power policies. Have tensions eased on one front to
thepoint of dooming progress on the others? While it may be
too soon for accurate analysis, some consideration of future
prospects for progress based on the new situation should be
undertaken.
107November 1974 - January 1975 prior to the shuttle





The role of future super-power foreign policies in the
Middle East will probably generate speculation as long as
the world exists in the form we know today. If, however, the
impact of the Yom Kippur War has been as substantial as is
the contention of this paper, some consideration must be given
to the future prospects resulting from that impact. These
possibilities will be affected by the internal politics of
both super-powers, the overall world situation, and the
balance between the two powers, currently characterized as
the process of detente. Although these various levels are
interrelated, an attempt will be made to trace these inter-
actions in the two super-powers beginning internally, and
moving to the international arena, concluding in their possible
interaction in the Middle East.
The significant upcoming event in the near term United
States' scene is the 1976 Bicentennial Year election. An
often heard comment is that after the Egyptian-Israeli Agree-
ment of September 1975, there is little US motivation for
continued progress in the Middle East until after the US elec-
tion because the administration will be unwilling to take the
risks inherent in continuing the process. As a result,
Egyptians and Israelis, the idea continues, will also be
unwilling to make substantive efforts since they have stabilized
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their bilateral situation. A case may certainly be made for
this rationale, however, an equally good, and in some ways
superior, case may be made to the contrary. To be sure, the
US will be looking inward during the oncoming year, focusing
on the economy and other internal political issues. Many
of these issues will be contested in both parties as the
respective nominee races narrow. Since the incumbent admin-
istration faces substantial competition, a relatively rare
event on the political scene, pressure is on the administra-
tion to not only avoid errors but to demonstrate within the
party that it is capable of producing substantive results on
the issues facing the country. This pressure is particularly
strong in the area of foreign affairs, since the in-house
challenge to the Administration comes from the conservative
wing of the Republican Party. Questions concerning the
strategic balance between the US-USSR, US resolve in support
of friends, and positive accomplishments in the foreign area,
in general, are key concerns to this element of the President's
party. If the President were able to arrive at the conven-
tion having recently sponsored the opening of negotiations
which continued the progress in the Middle East, it would be
a substantial political asset. It would demonstrate an ability
to deal with one of the most difficult and dangerous problems
facing the US. Finally, because of the ever present pressure
of the energy question, stability and continued positive
peaceful progress in the Middle East would give the President
a strengthened position in the general election. This is
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true because it would affect both foreign and domestic issues
by reducing the danger of an international confrontation and
the possibility of another oil embargo.
Regardless of which party succeeds in the November 1976
election, since the economy and the US role in the world will
have been major campaign issues, pressure on the Administra-
tion to continue the progress will be substantial. The US,
furthermore, is now bound to the Middle East by congressional
approval of the US role in the Egypt-Israeli Agreement of
September 1975, security assistance programs to both sides
of the conflict, and Joint Commissions with both sides of
the conflict. The urgent need for recycling of the oil dol-
lars of the conservative Arab states rests, to a large degree,
on continued efforts to prevent another embargo. If in any
future embargo, the added weapon of withdrawal of Arab finan-
cial reserves from Western countries was employed, an economic
disaster of even greater potential than the oil weapon could
possibly occur. This fact adds to the already potent economic
motivation for continued and even increased US commitments
to the Middle East. On the international scene, the key US
relationships with Europe and Japan were tested by the con-
flict during the October War and the economic impact of the
war was even greater than on the US . Due to the multiple
linkages between the US and these countries, it is likely
that they will also support continued US involvement along
the lines of the past two years. Finally, with respect to
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the USSR, due to the simultaneous internal US political
pressures to both continue the process of detente while
insuring that the US is not substantially weakened, a posture
of continued resolve in the Middle East would be most pro-
ductive for any future Administration. This posture would
undoubtedly also be tempered by continued contacts with the
USSR-bilateral, in the UN and at Geneva. The US overall
future prospect in the Middle East was recently addressed
by Secretary Kissinger, he said, "There is no longer any
doubt of the United States' irrevocable commitment " (author's
emphasis) "and active involvement in furthering peace and
progress in the Middle East. Important changes have taken
place in the American peoples' attitudes. This is irrever-
sible " (author's emphasis) "and of tremendous importance
-r 4.V, * 4. ,,108for the future.
Analysis of future Soviet posture with respect to the
Middle East is, of course, a difficult but necessary task.
The most common danger in such analysis seems to lie in
oversimplification of the USSR as either a mirror image of
the US (only colder) or an exact opposite (bad guys) approach.
In reality, the USSR lies between these two extremes, pre-
senting an immense challenge to any modeler including the
10 8Secretary of State Kissinger statement, 29 September
1975, at the United Nations. Quoted from Department of
State Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services




classic works of Graham Allison. Obviously within the
context of this work, analysis must be kept to macro levels
and details left for future effort. As has been seen in
Sections III and IV, considerable controversy exists over
Soviet Middle East operations since the death of Nasir.
Internal to the decision making process, the. controversy
previously discussed will undoubtedly continue but must con-
tinue within the context of the everpresent struggle for
position within the Kremlin. While forecasts of Brezhnev's
intention to voluntarily retire have become less frequent
in recent months, the probability of a change at the top
within the next few years increases steadily with the passage
of time. Pressures on the Politburo members include that of
an ever lagging agricultural base; the yellow peril of a
China increasingly accepted by the remainder of the world
and actively seeking to limit Russian effort anywhere on the
globe; individual bureaucratic survival in one of the toughest
political arenas; and of course, the position of the USSR
in relation to the US. To the individual leader rising within
the Soviet system, policies and attitudes which will fit
these complex pressures together in such a way as to maximize
both his own and USSR's continued development are, of course,
109 .Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision , Explaining
the Cuban Missile Crisis , Harvard, 1971. Allison applies
three models, rational actor, organizational process, and
governmental politics to both the US and USSR in an attempt
to explain a particular international crisis.
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likely to be pursued. Thus, the Soviet leadership of the
future is likely to display a relationship between internal
and external pressures.
As the Soviets often point out, as a Middle Eastern power
their interest in the area is considerable, a secure posi-
tion on the land bridge would give them substantial gains
relative to both the US and China and access to the oil
that the Soviet economy will soon need. To be sure, the
Soviet policy would prefer to develop increased internal
oil in Siberia and elsewhere, but the economic cost required
for this development, with current technology, looks huge
and contains a high element of risk of failure. If astute
policy selection can achieve Soviet access to (relatively)
inexpensive Middle Eastern oil, the benefit to other sectors
of Soviet economy would be substantial. If these same
policies produce substantive strategic gains as well, they
become highly desirable. On the other hand, avoidance of
an all out nuclear war and even local conflicts wherein the
USSR has a low probability of success are also likely. The
Resource allocation planning in the USSR is a complex
planning process. Open source literature is becoming available
which indicates a multi-sector, input-output process which
generates several plans covering varying time frames from
greater than 15 years down to 1 year, all of which consider
strategic economic policies. See Economic Development and
Perspective Planning, ed. by N. P. Fedorenki, Progress Pub-
lishers, Moscow, 19 7 5 and Soviet Finance , ed. by I. D.
Zlobin et. al., Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975.
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process of detente is described in Soviet writings in a
manner much different from the West. The Party Journal
Moscow (Partinaya Zhizn) describes it as a "reflection of
the growing influence of the cooperation of socialist states
on the course of world development." Which hs been "the
basis of the outstanding successes of the socialist foreign
policy . . . made up of the largest achievement of the Soviet
Union ... in the area of economics and defense." It
further postulates that support of wars of national libera-
tion will continue and under appropriate circumstances be
increased. The operation of such a definition could well
explain many of the USSR's efforts in the Middle East, inclu-
ding the protest against the US role in the Egypt-Israel
Agreement of 1975. It is likely that the Soviet situation
described above will continue largely unchanged barring a
cataclysmic event such as a nuclear exchange or a major
clash with China. What specific Middle Eastern super-power
interaction may then be reasonably expected based upon the
foregoing analysis of their individual situations?
Due to the impact of the October War, it would seem
logical that there exists a high probability of continued
US commitment to develop increased contacts between the
Joint Publications Research Service, Translations on
USSR Political and Sociological Affairs
, N. 64 2, "Party Journal
Cites Soviet Views on Detente", Moscow Partinaya Zhizn, in
Russian, N. 9, May 1975, p. 5-7, 25 June, 1975.
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parties to the conflict. A likely next US effort (not
necessarily step) would be to encourage some form of dialogue
between the PLO/Palestinians and Israel. Also as a result
of the October War, the Soviet shift toward the more radical
of Palestinian and Arab views and the fact that the primary
Soviet role in the states still cooperating with the USSR
is that of arms supplier, the following Soviet policies
appear likely: (1) Public and private encouragement of
Arab radical elements, particularly Palestinian groups in
that category. (2) Private support of efforts to limit or
even topple the moderate leaders of the key states (Egypt,
Syria, and Israel). (3) Private efforts (carrot and stick),
on arms flow to those states still heavily committed to Soviet
arms (Syria and Iraq) to increase their support for the
radical cause to the frustration of US efforts.
What the long term impact of the interaction of these
potential super-power policies within the every changing
milieu of the Middle East will be is, of course, unknown and
may remain so for several years.
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IX. CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTARY
The full impact of the October 1973 War on super-power
policies in the Middle East may not yet have occurred. Sub-
stantial changes, however, have taken place in the Middle
East roles of the US and the USSR. It has been shown that
the War was planned and initiated to begin a political pro-
112
cess of movement in the conflict. This process has involved
a striking new role for the United States which now rests
113its Middle East policy on three points. (1) A firm commit-
ment to work for a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict which takes into account the legitimate
interests of all states and peoples of the area, including
the Palestinians. (2) Improve US relations with all the
states of the Middle East on a bilateral basis, maintaining
support for Israel's security while strengthening relations
with Arab states. (3) Prevent the Middle East from becoming
a sphere of influence of any outside power. One of the key
questions of the conflict to date has been the manner in
which the Palestinians should be introduced into the peace
efforts. The PLO and its policies have been such that no
See Sections III and IV.
113
"United States Foreign Policy, Overview", p. 27, US
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C, May 1975.
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negotiations with the Israelis has been possible, this may
be in the process of beginning to change. The US position
has been that it will not deal with the PLO until it recog-
nizes the existence of Israel and accepts Security Council
114Resolutions 242 and 338. It is possible that both Israel
and the PLO are now considering ways to moderate their posi-
tions such that communication would be possible. It is felt
in many interested quarters that it is highly desirable for
the next agreement/understanding to contain some indication
of the form of the final settlement, or at least, the aim
toward this goal must be expanded if progress is to continue.
Deliniation of such an indication may be the greatest hurdle
faced by the post-1973 War equation. If it can be achieved,
it will be the most substantial step toward a final resolution
of the Middle East crisis.
Senator McGovern, in his report to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee recognizes three realities in the Middle
East: America's interests in Israel, US interests on the
Arab side, and the Palestinians. To these three areas, if
one adds the inescapable interests of the USSR and the religious
question of Jerusalem one has the major elements which must
be balanced in attempting to solve the entire crisis. Little
114Most recently stated by Secretary Kissinger in
Washington, D. C, press conference, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Office of Media Services Release, PR596/79, p. 6
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has been said of late about the Jerusalem question, perhaps
in recognition of the fact that it lies last on most lists
of issues that must be discussed. While the Middle East
powers and the great religions of the area have intense
interest in the question, it has little impact on major power
interests. It must, of course, be recognized that any settle-
ment, if it is to be successful, must satisfactorily answer
the Jerusalem question because of its great religious
significance.
While this paper has concentrated on the impact of the
events surrounding the October War on super-power Middle
East policies, little attention has been paid to events
outside of the Middle East which may have affected those
policies. It has been shown that the USSR relates other world
115
areas to the Middle East, but what of the US? Have the
failures in Vietnam and the trauma of Watergate colored US
policies in the post-1973 time frame? In the view of Presi-
dent Sadat, they have not. When specifically asked the ques-
tion concerning Southeast Asia, he replied "not at all."
Another issue that has not been addressed herein is the
possibility of a settlement jointly imposed and enforced by
115See Section VIII.
Al Sadat interview with Senator McGovern, McGovern




the super-powers. The probability of such an event is
believed to be bordering on minute given the current situa-
tion in the Middle East and the ongoing process resulting
from the 197 3 War. Secretary Kissinger has stated that "we
have not thought it wise to impose a settlement, and our
policy has been designed to enable the parties concerned to
117
negotiate." In fact, it was essentially a Soviet ulti-
matum to either join in an imposition/intervention or risk a
unilateral Soviet intervention that triggered the US alert
during the War. It is, thus, difficult to develop a scenario
wherein such a degree of super-power cooperation could be
generated coincident to their other interests. Additionally,
even if the US and the USSR were to attempt such a course,
it is by no means clear that a joint intervention could pro-
duce a solution. Naturally, it does remain clear that any
final solution, to be viable, must have at least the tacit
acceptance of both powers
.
The recent effort to equate Zionism with racism and the
effort to expel Israel from the UN should also be considered.
Analysts have ascribed varying significance to these events,
of concern here is the perception of the super-powers of
these events. If the analysis in Section VIII of this paper
117Secretary of State Kissinger, Press Conference,
Washington, D. C, 24 May 1975. Quoted from Department of
State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services
Release, PR297/56, p. 7.
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is substantially correct, these forms of condemnation of
Israel are typical of the public efforts which the USSR may
be expected to support. With respect to the US, it seems
that the position of the Administration, Ambassador Moyni-
han ' s eloquence not to the contrary, is that the Zionism
vote in the UN was a form of moral condemnation of Israel
118
and not an abstract vote on Zionism. If such is the case,
the vote, while distressing to the US, Israel, and many-
others, does not constitute a severe threat to continued
progress in the Middle East.
Although the key test of the new balance in the Middle
East resulting from the 1973 War may be yet to come in the
on-going negotiations to hammer out some agreement which
mentions a form for a final overall settlement, it is clear
that the events associated with the War have already had
substantial impacts on super-power Middle East policy. Central
among the various changes has been the US assumption of a
new role in the conflict. A role approved by both sides of
the conflict and one that is recognized and approved by
both major political parties in the US. This role was initi-
ated by the dual pressures of Soviet actions during the war
and Arab political/economic pressure of oil embargo. It has
118Secretary of State Kissinger Press Conference, Pitts-
burg, Pennsylvania, 12 November 1975, Department of State




expanded at the request of both sides to include a US civilian
presence in the Sinai as part of the first substantive step
toward an overall settlement. It continues to expand in the
form of increasing economic and security assistance to both
sides. It has been enabled by the recognition of both sides
that in both the long and short run, resorting to the mili-
tary option is likely to be less productive than negotiations.
This US role is likely to continue. The impact of the War
on the Soviet Union has been to reduce its influence, or
perhaps, confirm that its actual influence never really was
reflected accurately by its position as the leading arms
supplier of the Arab cause. Because of the strategic and
economic significance of the Middle East to the USSR it may
be expected to exercise every opportunity to secure a stable
position in the area at the expense of the US whenever possi-
ble. This combination makes it likely that the USSR will
continue its increasing support of radical Arab elements to
the detriment of the moderates.
While it is not the object of this work to make policy
suggestions, some obvious conclusions stand out. The US role,
and consequently the current process, depends largely upon
the continuance in office on both sides of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, of strong moderate leaders. Support of those
leaders, whenever and wherever possible is likely to bolster
the new process. While both sides of the dispute have more
than once since the War, rejected the military option, it
84

does not follow that they would no longer resort to war
under any circumstances. On the contrary, given a long
stagnation in the current process, pressure on the major
Arab leaders for another round would mount. In similar
fashion, if a clear and present threat to Israel was per-
ceived by the leaders, for example, a PLO/Syrian attempt to
take over or partition Lebanon, internal pressure for a
preemptive Israeli strike would mount.
The leaders of both sides of the conflict have demon-
strated great courage, wisdom, and perseverance in the post-
War period. They now have the responsibility to continue
their efforts. It is the hope of the world that the
leaders of Egypt, Israel, Palestine, and Syria will succeed
in concluding a just peace for their people. If they do
succeed, it may well be that the impact of the October War
on super-power Middle East policy marked the beginning of

















534.3 604.3 84.7 689.0 3
1919 568.0 642.0 58.0 700.0 1.8
1922 71.5 589.2 668.3 83.8 752.1 8.7
1931 87.9 753.8 851.7 172.0 1,023.7 4.1
1935 103.4 826.5 940.8 320.4 1,261.2 66.5
1936 106.5 848.3 966.0 370.5 1,336.5 29.6
1939 117.0 927.1 1,056.3 445.5 1,501.8 31.2
1942 127.2 995.3 1,135.6 484.4 1,620.0 4.2
1946 145.1 1,076.8 1,237.3 608.2 1,845.5 18.8
ISRAEL: POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION 4
May 15-
Dec. 31
1948 120.0 758.7 878.7 101.8
1949 34.0 111.5 160.0 ,013.9 1,173.9 239.6
1950 36.0 116.1 167.1 1 ,203.0 1,370.1 170.2
1955 43.3 136.3 198.6 1,,590.5 1,789.1 37.5
1960 49.6 166.3 239.1 1 ,911.2 2.150.4 24.5
1965 57.1 212.4 299.3 2,,299.1 2,598.4 30.7




"^Palestine Royal Commission, Memorandum Prepared by the Government
of Palestine (Colonial No. 133, 1937), if; A Survey of Palestine (1946),
II, 794f; UN, Spec. Com. on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly
(1947), I, 12; Government of Israel, Statistical Abstract, 1967, Table D/3,
2
Totals include Druze and others. In Israel, the Druze made up about
10 per cent of the total non-Jewish population before the June war.
3
Between 1882 and 1914, from 55,000 to 70,000 Jews migrated to
Palestine and between 1882 and 1967, the estimated percentage of world
Jewry in Palestine increased from 0.3 to 17.1. Between 1919 and May 14,
1948, 44,809 (10.4 per cent) of those coming to Palestine originated from
Asia and Africa and 385,066 (89.6 per cent) from Europe and America.
Between May 15, 1948 and 1964, 640,635 (54.8 per cent) came from Asia and
Africa and 528,996 (45.2 per cent) from Europe and America (Statistical
Abstract, 1967, Tables B/3, D/3, and D/4) .
4
Statistical Abstract, 1967, Tables B/l and D/3; Israel Digest, Oct.
20, 1967, 7; Government of Israel, Facts about Israel, 1968 (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs) , 60.
5
Population figures apply to both Israel and the areas occupied as





APAB PEFUGEES REGISTERED WITH UNRWA—KINDS OF ASSISTANCE—1951-1967.-'—i.
Baliies and Members of
children Families
registered receiving
Full-ration Half-ration for ser- no rations
Year ended recipients recipients vices only or services Total
June, 1951 826,459 51,034 2,174 24,455 904,122
June, 1952 805,593 58,733 18,347 32,738 915,411
June, 1955 828,531 17,228 60,227 63,403 969,389
June, 1960 849,634 16,202 150,170 73,452 1,, 120, 889*
June, 1965 859,048 15,546 251,131 107,122 1.,280,823*
June, 1966 845,730 15,392 284,025 108,750 1,,317,749*
May, 1967 845,625 15,326 311,466 106,843 1.,344,576*
Includes members receiving no rations and members of families
receiving only educational and medical services.
SOURCE: Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1966-30 June 1967, GA, OR 22nd Ses,
Supp. No. 13 (A/6713), Table 1, 59.
TABLE 3
ARAB REFUGEES REGISTERED WITH UNRWA—AGE GROUPS AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE,
May 31, 1967
1 year 15 years No. of
and below 1-15 years and over Total families
Jordan 11,993 255,985 454,709 722,687 128,273
Gaza 8,984 120,941 186,851 316,776 55,617
Lebanon 3,481 64,432 92,810 160,723 36,998
Syria 3,794 59,620 80,976 144,390 33,359
Totals 28,252 500,978 815,346 1,344,576 254,247
SOURCE: Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1966-30 June 1967, GA, OR 22nd Ses,





POPULATION CHANGES RESULTING FROM THE JUNE WAR






































Statement by Commissioner-General of UNRWA to the UN General Assem-
bly' s Special Political Cornnittee on Dec. 11, 1967 (A/SPC/121, 2ff) : and
a letter in March, 1968 from the UNRWA Liaison Office, New York City.
2
Israel claimed that on the basis of her Sept. 1967, census, there
were (1) 597,000 refugees and residents still living on the west bank
—
excluding the Old City of Jerusalem, with 66,000 people and the surrounding
area formally annexed by her; and (2) 356,000 refugees and residents in the
Gaza Strip—including 2,000 citizens of the former Egyptian half of the
town of Rafah. (Israel Digest , Oct. 20, 1967, 7; Facts about Israel,




The Israeli census covered only the northern section of the Sinai,
where it found 33,000 Egyptians, nearly all in the al-Arish area. Israel
estimated earlier that there were approximately 40,000 Bedouin in the
central portion of the Sinai. (Israel Digest, Oct. 20, 1967; Sept. 8, 5.)
TABLE 5
JEWISH POPULATION BY ORIGIN
Nov. 1948 o.'o Dec. 1972 o*o
Israel 253,700 35.4 1,305,400 48
ME and Asia 57,800 8.1 318,000 11.7
Egypt and Africa 12,200 1.7 358,300 13.2
Europe-America 393,000 54.8 743,000 27.5
Political Dictionary of the Middle East , 1974, p. 462.
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS DURING THE OCTOBER WAR
1973
Oct. 6, War breaks out in the Middle East on the Jewish holy
day of Yora Kippur. Egyptian forces cross the Suez Canal and
Syria attacks the Golan Heights. Israeli forces counter on
Oct. 7, striking back in the Sinai on the Golan Heights.
Oct. 7. Iraq nationalizes the American-owned Mobil Oil
Corporation and Exxon Corporation.
Oct. 8. Tunisia, the Sudan, and Iraq pledge support of
Egyptian and Syrian forces battling Israel.
Oct. 10. Israel announces it has abandoned the Bar-Lev line
along the Suez Canal but has pushed back Syrian forces from
the Golan Heights . Egyptian forces cross the Suez and advance
nearly 10 miles onto the East bank. The Syrian army is pushed
back to the 1967 cease-fire line.
Oct. 12. Israeli forces advance to within 18 miles of
Damascus, the capital of Syria.
•
-
Oct. 13. Jordan announces it will join Egypt and Syria in
the war against Israel. The same day Israel claims to have
nearly eliminated an Iraqi division in Syria.
Oct. 13. Saudi Arabian troops join the war against Israel
after urging by Egyptian President Sadat.
Oct. 15. The United States announces it is resupplying Israel
with military equipment to counterbalance a "massive airlift"
to Egypt by the Soviet Union.
Oct. 17. Egyptian President Sadat, in an open letter to
President Nixon, proposes an immediate cease-fire on the
condition that Israel withdraws to pre-1967 boundaries. The
same day, foreign ministers of four Arab states meet in
Washington with President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry
Kissonger to present a similar peace proposal.
Oct. 18. Libya cuts off all shipments of crude oil and





Oct. 18. Saudi Arabia announces a 10 per cent cut in oil
production and pledges to cut off all US oil shipments if
American support of Israel continues.
Oct. 19. President Nixon asks Congress to appropriate
$2.2-billion for emergency military aid for Israel.
Oct. 19. Libya cuts off all exports to the United States
and raises the price of oil from $4.90 to $8". 92 per barrel.
Oct. 20. Saudi Arabia halts oil exports to the United States.
Oct. 20. Secretary of State Kissinger arrives in Moscow for
talks with Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev
on restoring peace to the Middle East.
Oct. 21. Iraq nationalizes the holdings of Royal Dutch Shell
Corp.
Oct. 21. The United States and the Soviet Union present a
joint resolution to the U.N. Security Council calling for a
cease-fire in place in the Middle East and for implementation
of a Security Council resolution calling for Israeli with-
from lands occupied since the 19 67 war. The proposal,
formulated during Kissinger's trip to Moscow, is adopted by
the Security Council early Oct. 22.
Oct. 22. A cease-fire takes effect on the Egyptian-Israeli
front, but fighting continues nonetheless.
Oct. 22. Kissinger confers with Israeli Premier Golda Meir
in Israel on his way back to Washington from Moscow. Mean-
while, Jordan accepts the U.S ,-U.S .S .R. cease-fire proposal.
Iraq and the Palestinian Liberation Organization reject it.
Oct. 23. The U.N. Security Council votes to reaffirm the
Middle East cease-fire, asks Egypt and Israel to return to
the cease-fire line established the day before, and asks that
U.N. observers be stationed along the Israeli-Egyptian cease-
fire line. The U.N. secretary general announces Syria will
accept the cease-fire if Israel withdraws from lands occupied
during the 1967 war.
Oct. 24. Tension mounts as Israel and Egypt continue fighting
despite the cease-fire arrangment. Israel claims a 20,000-
man Egyptian force, encircled by Israeli forces on the east
bank of the Suez Canal has tried unsuccessfully to break out.
In Washington, the White House announces it will not send





President Nixon orders a world-wide U.S. military
alert as tension mounts over whether the Soviet Union may
intervene in the Middle East crisis, Kissinger says there are
"ambiguous" indications of that action.
Oct. 25. To avert a U.S . -U.S . S . R. confrontation in the
Middle East, the U.N. Security Council votes to establish an
emergency supervisory force to observe the cease-fire. The
force would exclude troops from the permanent Security Council
members, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union.
Oct. 27. The United States announces that Egypt and Israel
have agreed to negotiate directly on its implementing the
cease-fire
.
Oct. 28. The trapped Egyptian III Corps receives food, water
and medical supplies after Israel agrees to allow a supply
convoy to pass through Israeli lines. It is reported that
Israel yielded following U.S. warnings that the Soviet Union
threatened to rescue the troops.
Oct. 29. In a flurry of diplomatic activity, Egyptian Foreign
Minister Fahmi meets with Kissinger in Washington.
Oct. 29. Syrian President Assad says Syria accepted the
cease-fire after U.S.S.R. guarantees of Israeli withdrawal
from all occupied territory and recognition of Palestinian
rights
.
Oct. 31. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir arrives in
Washington for talks with President Nixon on her country's
concern over U.S. pressure to make concessions. The same day,
Egyptian President Sadat warns that his country will take up
the fight again if Israel does not withdraw to the cease-fire
lines of Oct. 22, 1973.
Nov. 1. Israeli Prime Minister Meir, meeting in Washington
with President Nixon, says she has been assured of continued
U.S. support.
Nov. 2. Secretary of State Kissinger meets separately in
Washington with Meir and Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi.
Nov. 4. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OAPEC) cuts back total oil production by 25 per cent




Nov. 7. After talks between Kissinger and Sadat, it is
announced that Egypt and the United States will resume
diplomatic relations. Ties are resumed Feb. 28, 1974.
Nov. 8. Kissinger flies to Jordan and Saudi Arabia to meet
with leaders there.
Nov. 11. Israel and Egypt sign a cease-fire' accord, drawn
up by Kissinger and Sadat during recent talks. The six-
point plan calls for (1) both sides to observe the cease-
fire, (2) immediate discussions on the return to the Oct. 22
cease-fire lines, (3) immediate food and medical supplies
for Suez City, (4) access for non-military supplies to the
stranded Egyptian III Corps on the east bank of the Suez
Canal, (5) replacement of Israeli troops along the Suez by





"Brezhnev's new plan, as submitted to his colleagues,
seems to have consisted of the following interconnected
elements
:
1. A further Soviet buildup of the forces of the
"progressive" Arab regimes—Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria
—
starting in the fall of 1972 and escalating gradually during
the subsequent year. They would be supplied with highly
sophisticated weapons, which the USSR had been unable to
spare previously and which would extend even to items not
previously given to non-communist states, but the weapons
would be accompanied this time by intensive training of the
most thorough kind.
2. As extra insurance against renewed failure or
incompetence on the part of the Middle East recipients, some
of the most complex new hardware would be handled in combat
not by Arab or Soviet or Warsaw Pact personnel, but by
military elements from other communist countries, whose
death or capture would not involve a NATO-Warsaw Pact
confrontation
.
3. Most remaining Soviet would be withdrawn in a
demonstrative fashion once the USSR's Middle East clients
were ready for combat and had decided to proceed to war, as
an "alibi" to convince Washington that Moscow at least had
not defaulted on its basic commitment to eschew direct combat
involvement.
4. Moscow's clients then would go into offensive deploy-
ment, exploiting an occasion when the United States was
distracted by a domestic or other crisis, and the Israelis
would be forced to mobilize their citizen army, a costly
operation that they could not sustain for long or repeat
continuously
.
5. Once the Israelis had mobilized, their opponents
would back off but would return to offensive dispositions as
soon as the Israeli alert was called off and the whole
maneuver would be replayed until the Israelis, because of
economic drain or because their vigilance gradually had
become dulled, were caught responding tardily.
Ra'anan, Uri, "Soviet Decision Making in the Middle East
1959-1973", originally in Orbis, 17, 3, reprinted and quoted
from Soviet Naval Policy , Objectives and Constraints , MccGuire,




6. Moscow's clients would thus, at the least, achieve
a tactical surprise, which if it did not suffice for
them to gain a final and decisive victory, would probably be
enough to drag Israel into a relatively long, defensive
struggle, the attrition of which might prove too much for
a small state.
7. To ensure its clients "longer breath" than Israel
during such an attrition period, the USSR would rapidly
launch a massive air-and-sea lift to its Middle East friends.
8
.
As long as fighting favored its clients sufficiently
for them to seize and hold ground, and to recoup prestige,
the USSR would sabotage U.S. efforts, at the U.N. and else-
where, to terminate the bloodshed.
9. The moment the war turned against its clients, the
Kremlin would insist on an immediate cease fire in place and
would embarrass Washington into agreeing to it by suddently
offering at least partial support for the kind of proposals
Washington undoubtedly would have made earlier, at the
outbreak of the war
.
10. If the Israelis demurred at being thus robbed of the
fruits of victory and insisted that the invading forces be
thrown back at least to the preconflict lines, Soviet leaders
could always dramatically go through the motions of preparing
the dispatch of an intervention force to the area; at which
point Washington no doubt would attempt to deter Moscow, but,
at the same time would be only too eager to avoid an actual
confrontation and, as a "compromise," would agree jointly
with the USSR to impose a cease fire upon the combatants.
11. Such a naked demonstration of Soviet determination
and might would have the additional advantage of making Cairo
and Damascus say "Thank you, Moscow" rather than "Thank you,
Moscow and Washington" for being rescued in time. Moscow's
clients would end up with some symbolically important terri-
torial gains and would have caused Israel painful losses, and
Soviet prestige would be triumphantly restored— all this
without real danger of nuclear confrontation with the United
States since Soviet combat forces would not actually be
involved. Above all, Washington, frightened by this
dramatic orchestration of the Arab-Soviet claim that the
Middle East was a "tinderbox," would pressure Israel into
a basically pro-Arab settlement to avoid dangers. This would
constitute substantial proof that it paid to be a client of




SECOND STAGE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT -
Text of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel, the Annex
to the Egypt-Israel Agreement, and the U.S. Proposal for an
early warning system in Sinai.
AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL
The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the
Government of Israel have agreed that:
ARTICLE I
The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall
not be resolved by miliatary force but by peaceful means.
The Agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974,
within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, consti-
tuted a first step towards a just 3Tid durable peace according
to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of
October 22, 1973.
They are determined to reach a final and just peace
settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security
Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant
step towards that end.
ARTICLE II
The parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat
or use of force or military blockade against each other.
ARTICLE III
The Parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the
ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all
military or para-military actions against each other.
The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained
in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an
integral part of this Agreement.
ARTICLE IV
A. The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed
in accordance with the following principles:
(1) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of
the lines designated as Lines J and M on the attached map.




(2) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of
the line designated as Line E on the attached map.
(3) The area between the lines designated on the
attached map as Lines E and F and the area between the lines
designated on the attached map as Lines J and K shall be
limited in armament and forces.
(4) The limitations on armaments and forces in the
areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as
described in the attached Annex.
(5) The zone between the lines designated on the
attached map as Lines E and J, will be a buffer zone. In
this zone the United Nations Emergency Force will continue
to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli
Agreement of January 18, 1974.
(6) In the area south from Line E and west from
Line M, as defined on the attached map, there will be no
military forces, as specified in the attached Annex.
B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeploy-
ment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments
and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early
warning and surveillance installations and the use of the
roads, the United Nations functions and other arrangements
will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex
and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of
the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant
to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an
integral part of this Agreement.
ARTICLE V
The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall
continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended
annually.
ARTICLE VI
The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the
duration of this Agreement. It will function under the aegis
of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping
Missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem
arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations
Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint
Commission shall function in accordance with procedures
established in the Protocol.
ARTICLE VII
Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel





This agreement is regarded by the Parties as a signifi-
cant step towards a just and lasting peace. It is not a
final peace agreement.
The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate
a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva
Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council
Resolution 33 8.
ARTICLE IX
This agreement shall enter into force upon signature
of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a
new agreement
ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT
Within 5 days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel
Agreement, representatives of the two Parties shall meet in
the Military Working Group of the Middle East Peace
Conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed
Protocol for the implementation of the Agreement. The
Working Group will complete the Protocol within 2 weeks.
In order to facilitate preparation of the Protocol and
implementation of the Agreement, the two Parties have agreed
on the following principles, which are an integral part of
the Agreement, as guidelines for the Working Group.
1. Definitions of Lines and Areas.
The deployment lines, Areas of Limited Forces and
Armaments, Buffer Zones, the area south from Line E and
west from Line M, other designated areas, road sections for
common use and other features referred to in Article IV of






(a) Access to the Buffer Zones will be controlled by the
United Nations Emergency Force, according to procedures to be
worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations
Emergency Force.
(b) Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly
freely up to the forward line of that Party. Reconnaissance
aircraft of either Party may fly up to the middle line of the
Buffer Zone between Lines E and J on an agreed schedule.
100

(c) In the Buffer Zone between Lines E and J, there will
be established under Article IV of the Agreement an Early
Warning System entrusted to United States civilian personnel
as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this
Agreement.
(d) Authorized personnel shall have access to Buffer
Zone for transit to and from the Early Warning System; the
manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by
the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.
3. Area South of Line E and West of Line M
(a) In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will
assure that there are no military or para-military forces of
any kind, military fortifications and military installations;
it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of move-
ment necessary to perform this function.
(b) Egyptian civilians and third-country civilian oil
field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from,
work, and live in the above indicated area, except for
Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and the United Nations Posts. Egyptian
civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform
normal civil police functions among the civilian population
in such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall
be provided for in the Protocol.
(c) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or
by sea, shall be only through the United Nations Emergency
Force checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at
other points, with the precise locations and number to be
included in the Protocol.
(d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be
limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed
civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the
civilian activities of the area as agreed by the VJorking Group,
(e) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently
existing civilian installations and infrastructures.
(f) Procedures for use of the common sections of the
coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by
the Working Group and detailed in the Protocol.
4. Aerial Surveillance
There shall be a contimiation of aerial reconnaissance
missions by the United States over the areas covered by the
Agreement (the area between Lines F and K) , following the
same procedures already in practice. The missions will
ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission
every 7-10 days, with either Party or the United Nations
Emergency Force empowered to request an earlier mission.
The United States Government will make the mission results
available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the Chief





5. Limitation of Forces and Armaments
(a) Within the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments
(the areas between Lines J and K and Lines E and F) the major
limitations shall be as follows:
(1) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions.
(2) Seventy-five (75) tanks.
(3) Seventy- two (72) artillery pieces, including
heavy mortars (i.e., with caliber larger than 120 mm.),
whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) km.
(4) The total number of personnel shall not exceed
eight thousand (8,000).
(5) Both Parties agree not to station or locate in
the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side.
(6) Both Parties agree that in the areas between
Lines J and K, and between Line A (of the Disengagement
Agreement of January 18, 1974) and Line E, they will con-
struct no new fortifications or installations for forces of
a size greater than that agreed herein.
(b) The major limitations beyond the Areas of Limited
Forces and Armaments will be:
(1) Neither side will station nor locate any weapon
in areas from which they can reach the other line.
(2) The Parties will not place anti-aircraft missiles
within an area of ten (10) kilometres east of Line K and
west of Line F, respectively.
(c) The United Nations Emergency Force will conduct
inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed
limitations within these areas.
6. Process of Implementation
The detailed implementation and timing of the redeploy-
ment of forces, turnover of oil fields, andother arrangements
called for by the Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be
determined by the Working Group, which will agree on the
stages of this process, including the phased movement of
Egyptian troops to Line E and Israeli troops to Line J.
The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and
installations to Egypt. This process will begin within 2
weeks from the signature of the Protocol with the introduc-
tion of the necessary technicians, and it will be completed
no later than 8 weeks after it begins. The details of the
phasing will be worked out in the Military Working Group.
Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed




In connection with the Early Warning System referred to
in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel con-
cluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agreement
(hereafter referred to as the Basic Agreement) , the United
States proposes the following:
1. The Early Warning System to be established in accordance
with Article IV in the area shown on the map attached to the
Basic Agreement will be entrusted to the United States. It
shall have the following elements:
a. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide
strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one
operated by Israeli personnel. Their locations are shown
on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. Each station
shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and adminis-
trative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual
and electronic surveillance only within their stations.
b. In support of these stations, to provide tactical
early warning and to verify access to them, three watch
stations shall be established by the United States in the
Mitla and Giddi Passes as will be shown on the map attached
to the Basic Agreement. These stations shall be operated,
by United States civilian personnel. In support of these
stations, there shall be established three unmanned elec-
tronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in the
general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and
from those stations.
2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the
following duties in connection with the operation and main-
tenance of these stations:
a. At the two surveillance stations described in para-
graph la. above, United States civilian personnel v/ill verify
the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement
into and out of each station and will immediately report any
detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and
electronic surveillance to the Parties to the Basic Agreement
and to the United Nations Emergency Force.
b. At each watch station described in paragraph lb.
above, the United States civilian personnel will immediately
report to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United
Nations Emergency Force any movement of armed forces, other
than the United Nations Emergency Force, into either Pass
and any observed preparations for such movement.
c. The total number of United States civilian personnel
assigned to functions under this Proposal shall not exceed





3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other
facilities covered by this Proposal, except for small arms
required for their protection.
4. The United States personnel serving the Early Warning
System shall be allowed to move freely within the area of
the System.
5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled
to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary
to perform their functions.
6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local
criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be
accorded any other specific privileges and immunities
provided for in the United Nations Emergency Force Agreement
of February 13, 1957.
7. The United States affirms that it will continue to
perform the functions described above for the duration of
the Basic Agreement.
8. Notwithstanding any other provision -of this Proposal,
the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it
concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation
of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case
the Parties to the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance
in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative
arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request
the United States to conclude its role under this Proposal,
The United States will consider such requests conclusive.
9. Technical problems including the location of the watch






EGYPT-ISRAEL AGREEMENT 1975 1
EG7PT
LIM6 £ £CSPTiflfJ UNf
L»we T £SftA£Xl LIMP
i^ N >A i Mto M€0-
ON BoFVcR. Z«>K
UUt K LirMT at I*RAet.|
f>f?.v\^ LiKITfiTioio
f\ft»A.S x.t i*lr*T i»»0
URAELI £oUTR.aUtO
A<i6 A FfcoM, SoFFf 1
2^WtS t EchCTi AO AHe A





Abboushi, W. F., Political Systems of the Middle East in the
2 0th Century , Dodd Mead & Co., New York, 1970.
Allison, G., Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis , Harvard, 1971.
Antonius , G., The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab
National Movement , Beirut, 1962.
Armajani, Y., Middle East — Past and Present , Prentice-Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1970.
Bullard, Sir R., Britain and the Middle Eas_b, rev. ed.,
London, 1952.
Badeau, J. S., The American Approach to the Arab World
,
New York, 19 68.
Barbour, N. , NisjL Dqmi^rus, a Survey of the Palestine
Controversy , Beirut, 1969.
Be'eri, E., Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society
,
London, 1970.
Bentwich, N., Israel : Two Fateful Years , 1967-69 , London,
1969.
Berque, J., The Arabs : Their History and Future , London,
1964.
Bonne, A., State and Economics in the Middle East , 2nd ed.,
London, 19 60.
Bose, T. C, The Superpowers and the Middle East , Asia
Publishing, Bombay, 1972.
Burns, E. L. M. , Between Arab and Israel i, London, 19 62.
Contemporary International Lav/, Ed. by G. Tunkin, Progress
Publishers, Moscow, USSR, "English ed., 1969.
Coon, C. S., Caravan - The Story of the Middle East , Holt,
Rhinehart, New York, 1961.
106

Dallin, Alexander, The Soviet Union at the United Nations
,
Praeger Press, Hew York, 1962.
Davis, J. H., The Evasive Peace , A Study of the Zionist-Arab
Problem , London, 196 8.
Draper, T., Israel and World Politics , Viking Press, New
York, 1968.
Economic Development and Perspective Planning , ed. by N. P.
Fedorenko, Progress Publishers , Moscow, 197 5.
Elwell-Sutton, L. P., Persian Oil — A Study in Power Politics
,
London, 1955.
Esco Foundation for Palestine, Palestine , vol. II, Yale
University Press, New Haven Conn., 1947.
Esco Foundation for Palestine, Palestine , A Study of Jewish ,
Arab &_ British Policies , Yale University Press, New
Haven, Conn.
Evron, Y., Middle East : Nations , Superpowers and Wars ,
Praeger Press, 1973.
Friedman, R. 0. , Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Si nce
1970 , Praeger Press, New York, 1975.
Gervasi, F., The Case for Israel , The Viking Press, New
York, 1967.
Goitein, S. D. F., Jews and Arabs ; Their Contacts Through
the Ages , New York, 1955.
Hitti, P. K. , History of Syria , Including Lebanon and Palestine ,
London, 1951.
Hourani, A. H., Syria and Lebanon , Beirut, 1968.
Hurewitz, J. C. Middle East Politics : The Military Dimension ,
Praeger Press, London, 1969.
Hurewitz, J. C. , Middle East Dilemmas : The Background of
US Policy , Russel &. Ruseel.
Hurewitz, J. C, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East : A
Documentary Record
, vol. I - 1535-1914, vol. II - 1914-56,
Princeton, 19 56.
Ismael, T. Y., Governments and Politics of the Middle East ,
Dorsey Press, Homewood, 111., 1970.
107

Ismael, T. Y., Middle East in World Politics , Syracuse
University Press, Syracuse, 1974.
Issawi, C. , Oil, The Middle East and World , Center for
Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, Library
Press, New York, 1972.
Khouri, F. J., The Arab Israeli Dilemma , Syracuse University
Press, Syracuse, N. Y., 1968.
Kimche, J., Palestine or Israel , Seeker and Warburg, 1974.
Klebanoff, S., Middle East Oil and US Foreign Policy , Praeger
Press, 1974.
Larson, T. B., Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev , Prentice
Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 196 8.
Leeman, W. A., The Price of Middle East Oil , Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1962.
Lenczowski, C, Russian and the West in Iran, 1914-48
,
Ithaca, N. Y., 1949.
Lenczowski, G., Soviet Advances in_ the Middle East , American
Enterprise Institute, Washington, D. C, 1971.
Lutsky, V., Modern History of the Arab Countries , Academy of
Sciences Institute, Progress PubTTshers, Moscow, USSR,
English ed. , 1969.
Luttwak, E. N., The Political Uses of Sea Power , Johns
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974.
Mandel, N., Zionism and Indigenous Population of Palestine
,
Oxford University, 1965.
The Middle East , ed. by Michael Adams, New York, Praeger
Press, 19 71.
The Middle East : A Political &_ Economic Survey, ed. by P.
Mansfield, Oxford Press, London, 1973.
Middle East : Quest for an American Policy
,
ed. by W. A.
Beling, N. Y., State University Press, 1973.
Middle East Oil and the Great Powers , 3rd ed. , ed. by Shwadran
& B. Wiley, Israel Program for Scientific Ties, N. Y.,
1974.
Miller, D. W. , Moore, C. D. The Middle East Yesterday and Today ,
Praeger Press, New York, 1970.
108

Nikitina, 6., The State of Israel , Progress Publishers,
Moscow 1973.
O'Brien, P. K., The Revolution in Egypt ' s Economic System :
From Private Enterprise to Socialism , 1952-1965 ,
London, 19 66.
Pahlevi, M. R. Shah, Mission for My Country , London, 1960.
Pennar, J., The USSR and the Arabs , Billing & Sons Ltd.,
London 1973.
Peretz, D. , The Middle East Today , Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
New York, 1971.
Peretz, D., Wilson, E. M. , Ward, R. J., A Palestine Entity,
The Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C, 1970.
Political Dictionary of the Middle East, ed. by Y . Shimoni
and E. Levine, rev. ed., Quadrangle/New York Times Book
Co. , New York, 197 4.
Quandt, W. B., Jabber, R. F., Lesch, A. M. , The Politics of
Palestinian Nationalism , University of California Press,
London, 1974.
Robinson, J., Palestine and the United States , Public Affairs
Press, Washington, D. C, 194 7.
Rodinson, M. , Israel and the Arabs , Pantheon Books, New
York, 1968.
Rondo t, P. , The Changing Patterns of the Middle East 1919-19 58,
Praeger Press, New York, 1961.
Safran, N., From War to War , Pegasus, New York, 1969.
Seale, P., The Struggle for Syria : A Study of_ Post-War
Arab Politics , 1945-1958 , London, 1965.
Sharabii, H., Palestine and Israel , Pegasus, New York, 1969.
Soviet Naval Policy , ed. , by M. MccGwire, K. Booth and J.
McDonnel, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1975.
Soviet Russia and the Middle East , ed. by A. S. Klieman,
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970.
Stocking, G. W. , Middle East Oil : A S tudy in Political and
Economic Controversy, Vanderbilt Press, 1970.
109

Stoessinger , J. G., The United Nations and the Super Powers
,
Random House, New York, 19 67.
Sykes, J., The Mountain Arabs , Chilton Book Co., Philadelphia,
Pa., 1968.
Tahtinen, D. R. , The Arab-Israeli Military Balanc e Today
,
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D. C, 1973.
The USSR and the Middle East , ed . by M. Cofino & S. Shamir,
Keter Press, Jerusalem, Israel, 1973.
Vicker, R. , The Kingdom of Oil , Chas. Scribner's Sons, New
York, 1974.
Williams, W. A., America and the Middle East , Rinehart and
Co. , New York, 1958.
Zionism : Instrument of Imperialist Reaction , Novosti Press
Agency Publishing House, Moscow, USSR, English ed., 1970.
DOCUMENT COLLECTIONS: UNITED NATIONS
Jerusalem 1947-1969 , Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut,
1970.
Palestine Refugees 1948-1967 , Institute for Palestine Studies,
Beirut", 197 0.
US Policy in the Middle East 1956-196 7, Department of State
USGAO, Washington, D. C, 19 67.
DOCUMENT COLLECTIONS: US GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE DOCUMENTS, OFFICE OF MEDIA SERVICES
RELEASE;
584-229/4, October 1974.
Series 9, May 19 75.
172/51, 26 March 1975.
Press Conference, 25 February 1975.
News Release, 6 March 1975.
Interview, 6 May 1975, PR387/64.
Revised Release, 1 September 1975.
GIST-Security Assistance, December 1975, PR506 1-2.






Report to Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
"Realities in the Middle East", 94th Congress, US
Government Printing Office, 52-743, 1975.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE;
25 June 1975.
FEDERAL BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE; ALL ENTRIES FROM
MIDDLE EAST SECTION;
1973-18 October.
1974-1 March, 24 March, 31 May, 3 June, 6 June, 27




Boston Sunday Globe, 2 September 1975.
London Times, 19 November 1974.
New York Times, 30 March 197 4.
Wall Street Journal, 1974-11 January, 8 May, 24 May, 5
September, 30 October, 11 November, 22 November,
2 7 December.
Washington Post, 2 6 September 19 73.
PERIODICALS ;
An Nahar Arab Report, 2 6 February 197 3.
Arab Report and Record, 1-15 April 1972.
Arab World Weekly, 22 January 1972.
Aviation Week and Space Technology, Report, "Both Sides of
Suez", November 1975.
Foreign Affairs Quarterly, Safran, N., "Engagement in the
Middle East", v. 54, p. 57, October 1974.




Journal of International Affairs, Quandt, W. B., "Kissinger
and the Arab-Israeli Disengagement Negotiations", v. 9,
#1, p. 38, 1975.
Middle East Economic Digest, 28 December 1974.
PAMPHLETS :
Adelphi Papers:
#26, "Sources of Conflict in the Middle East",
Institute for Strategic Studies, London, March
1966.
#53, "Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy", Institute
for Strategic Studies, London, December 1968.
#11, "Arab-Israeli War, October 1973, Background and
Events", London, 1974.
Arab Views, vol. XVI, #1, New York, January 1970, pp. 1-11.
Arab Israeli Dispute, Seminar at Sidney Sussix College,
Cambridge University, December 1970.
Current History:
"The Middle East, 1971", vol. 160, #353, Philadelphia,
January 1971.
"Africa, 1971", vol. 60, #355, Philadelphia, March
1971.
Editorial Research Reports:
"American Policy in the Middle East", Ralph C. Deans,
vol. II, #7, Washington, D. C, August 1970.
"Arab Guerillas", Hoyt Gimlin, vol. I, #16,
Washington, D. C, April 1969.
International Conciliation, "Issues Before the 23rd General
Assembly", Carnegie Endowment, #569, New York, September
1968.
International Documents on Palestine, Institute for Palestine
Studies, 1970.
Israeli Office of Information Reports:
"Arab Refugees", Ambassador M. S. Comay, New York,
1959.





1. Defense Documentation Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0212
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Department Chairman, Code 38
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
4. Asst. Professor J. W. Amos, Code 3 8AM
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
5. CAPT A. Jackson, USN
DCNO Plans and Policy (NOP-611)
Washington, D. C, 20350
6. LCDR A. E. Rypka, USN
2 4 Revere Road












The impact of the
October War on super-
power Middle East
pol icy.
51 M A Y 7 7





The impact of the




The impact of the October War on superpo
3 2768 000 99991 6
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
